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Foreword
The North African region has one of the most rapid population growth rates
of the world. Whereas the population has increased by a factor of three
since 1950, it is expected to further increase by at least a factor of two, most
likely a factor of four, and possibly even a factor of eight, depending on
future fertility, mortality, and migration trends. Given the extremely arid
climate of this world region, where fresh water availability is already a serious
problem, and that current climatemodels project significant further warming
well above the expected average warming of the world, these population
projections imply that there will be serious problems for the future of this
region and possibly increased migration pressure into Europe.
This report provides a concise and comprehensive review of available
data on past demographic trends in the region and combines this analysis
with expert opinion on alternative future demographic trends (as described
in Lutz, 1996) to calculate likely ranges of future population growth.
A very important and innovative feature of this study is that it explicitly
includes the educational status of the population in its projections. This is
done by means of multistate population projections, a method that largely
originated at IIASA. Educational projections are an important task in them-
selves because education, as the major component of human capital, is a key
factor in national development and in society’s ability to cope with aris-
ing problems. But the projection of education is also particularly suitable
for the demographic cohort–component method because it is the past and
present school enrollment of the young cohorts that largely determines the
future educational composition of the population. It turns out that, due to
the large educational fertility differentials and the great inter-cohort differ-
ences in education in the countries of North Africa, an explicit inclusion of
education in projections makes the population projections more accurate.
This study is not only relevant for the North African region and its
neighbors; it also demonstrates that generally it is feasible and very useful
to explicitly include education in population projections.
Gordon J. MacDonald
Director, IIASA
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11. Introduction
1.1 Research question
The population in the countries of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia) has tripled since 1950. Whereas it took 30
years for the population to grow from 53 million in 1950 to 110 million in
1980, it took only half that time to add another 53 million to reach an
estimated 163 million in 1996. This acceleration of population growth was
mostly due to rapidly declining mortality rates – infant mortality declined
from 19 percent of all births in 1950–1955 to an estimated 6 percent at
present – together with continued high fertility rates that, until 1980, were
above six children per woman. Since 1980 fertility has declined to about four
children per woman, but the very young age distribution in these countries
will fuel further high population growth for decades to come. By the middle
of the next century the population of the region is likely to double one more
time to about 340 million – between six and seven times the population in
1950.
Such rapid population growth is affecting the development of the region
as well as the surrounding regions. Governments in most countries of the
region recognize rapid population growth as a serious problem and have de-
veloped programs that attempt to stabilize it. Concern about this region was
expressed at the 1994 World Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo. This concern is largely based on the assumption that rapid popula-
tion growth will increase the social and economic problems of unemployment,
poverty, and poor health conditions. Environmental factors, especially those
focusing on the region’s acute water shortage, are also receiving attention.
Outside the region concern about the rapid population growth in North
Africa is increasing. In Europe, concern is mostly focusing on possible polit-
ical instability that may affect Europe and on the possibility of huge, uncon-
trollable migration from North Africa to Europe. Neither issue is directly
linked to population growth, but both are assumed to be closely associated
with it in the way that rapid population growth increases the probability of
such undesirable events. Rapid population growth makes the alleviation of
poverty more difficult and the reduction of unemployment among a rapidly
increasing number of young people almost impossible. Whether rapid pop-
ulation growth translates into increasing political instability will, to a large
degree, depend on local conditions. History has shown that massive unem-
ployment is a factor in political instability. As to migration into Western
2Europe, it is not clear if an increasing number of potential migrants trans-
lates into a greater number of actual migrants, although the popular press
often makes this association. Past migration waves were linked more often
to specific political events (such as the independence of Algeria) than to the
increasing population size of the region. This pattern, which shows political
crises rather than general population growth as the primary push factor,
may well continue.
For these reasons, it is worthwhile to take a close look at possible al-
ternative population trends in the countries of North Africa. This study
systematically addresses the issue of population change by age, sex, and ed-
ucational composition in the region. The first part presents discussions on
past trends in fertility, mortality, and education. This information is then
combined with expert opinions about possible alternative future trends that
subsequently are quantitatively translated into alternative scenarios. An in-
novative element in this study is the explicit consideration of education by
age and sex – assumed to be the most important component of socioeconomic
structure – and its inclusion as a dimension in population projections. To
our knowledge this is the first time that projections of a population’s edu-
cational composition by age and sex have systematically been produced for
a world region.
Originally, we considered the possibility of including the urban/rural
dimension in addition to age, sex, and education. During the process of
collecting data, however, we found that the data on internal migration and
urban/rural differentials in fertility and mortality were too fragmentary to
meaningfully incorporate them into the analysis. We also considered the
option of quantitatively addressing past and future migration from North
Africa to Europe. Again, not enough data were available for a thorough
analysis of international migration by age, gender, and education. How-
ever, a discussion of our alternative projections of future migration and its
potential impact on Europe is presented in the last section of this study.
1.2 Projection approach
This study on future population and education in North Africa follows the
approach of other studies recently conducted by the Population Project of
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The ap-
proach was introduced in a 1991 book, entitled Future Demographic Trends
in Europe and North America: What Can We Assume Today? (Lutz, 1991).
In this book a group of international experts systematically describe several
3possible future trends of fertility, mortality, and migration based on their
analyses of the past and their general understanding of the driving forces
of these demographic changes. In the final chapter, the diverse views of
these experts are quantitatively translated into alternative scenarios includ-
ing some rather extreme scenarios that are considered possible but not likely.
This approach differs from conventional population projections in two ways:
first, more emphasis is given to the substantive discussions and arguments
associated with specific assumptions of future fertility, mortality, and migra-
tion; and second, a broader range of possible alternative paths is presented
thus facilitating sensitivity analysis. This book was followed by a 1993 study,
entitled The Future of Europe’s Population (Cliquet, 1993). This book, pro-
duced by a working group of the Council of Europe, presents country-level
scenario calculations for 20 large member states of the Council of Europe.
(The full set of country tables is published in Prinz and Lutz, 1994.)
The scenario approach was further developed in The Future Population
of the World: What Can We Assume Today? (Lutz, 1994b). This book pro-
vides thorough background analysis of 12 major world regions, along with
the definition of two types of alternative scenarios: scenarios based on a sys-
tematic combination of symmetric assumptions in all three components, that
is, high, central, and low assumptions defined in a way that the central is the
mean of the high and low values; and specific long-range scenarios in which
the components are not assumed to be independent but some alternative
“stories” are developed about the ways in which future fertility, mortality,
and migration trends may respond under different social, economic, politi-
cal, and environmental conditions. In 1996 this book was revised, and the
approach was further advanced to produce a fully probabilistic set of pop-
ulation projections, that is, the reader is not just presented with different
scenarios of unknown likelihood but receives a best estimate – as defined
by a group of experts – of the probability of a certain future path and the
confidence intervals at different points in time. These projections may be
the first probabilistic world population projections published.
In addition to these methodological advances on the question of how
to deal with uncertainty, two further areas have recently been investigated:
one deals with regional disaggregation and the other with the incorporation
of structural variables other than age and sex. This study on North Africa
combines advances along both dimensions. It moves from the level of world
regions to that of individual countries and explicitly includes educational
status by age and sex. Another study, still under development, applies the
fully probabilistic approach to all countries of Eastern and Central-Eastern
4Europe. For the present study of North Africa a more conventional alter-
native scenario approach was chosen in order to include education, which is
believed to be extremely important not only for the region’s demographic
processes but for the sustainable development of the region as a whole. Sec-
tion 7 gives a brief look at the results of the probabilistic projections of
North Africa.
1.3 Relevance of education
Development economists and demographers have long identified educational
status of a population as a key factor, if not the single most important
determinant, in development. In the long run the human capital of a country
(namely, the skills of its people) outweighs all other production factors in
economic terms. From an international perspective it has been shown that
the most important comparative advantage of a country lies not in its natural
resources, geographic location, or wage level, but in the availability of, at
least, a semiskilled labor force (Forstner and Ballance, 1990). It may be
that universal basic education and literacy are more beneficial to a country’s
development than the existence of a highly educated elite in an otherwise
illiterate population.
Going beyond its economic benefits, basic education, especially of
women, seems to be a crucial aspect of empowerment. It allows men and
women to participate fully in society and improves their quality of life. It
also enables individuals and communities to cope better with the social,
economic, and environmental changes they face. In this sense education
as a proxy for learning and an increased understanding of the interconnec-
tions of the world around us may be considered the single most important
determinant of every society’s struggle to achieve sustainable development
that combines improvements in the quality of life with environmentally be-
nign behavior and an increasing ability to cope with all kinds of potential
disasters.
In the field of demography, female education has long been identified
as the single determinant in lowering fertility in countries that are in the
process of demographic transition. No other variable can explain fertility
differentials at the individual level, across countries, and over time better
than female education. There are also good theoretical explanations for
the crucial role of education. For example: more girls in schools results in
fewer teenage marriages; education allows women to thoughtfully plan their
life cycle; education strengthens a woman’s participation in society and her
5ability to realize her own, typically lower, family-size desires; an educated
young woman tends to have fewer children of whom she can take better care;
education tends to increase a woman’s knowledge about family planning and
probability of formal employment. There is much less empirical information
on mortality, but the information that is available in industrialized as well
as in developing countries points toward the existence of universal education
mortality differentials, with more highly educated women and men living
longer than less educated women and men. This is also true for the effects
of parents’ education on infant mortality. Again there are convincing expla-
nations for these differentials ranging from better information and healthier
life-styles to better access to health care. Educational differentials in mi-
gration have also been well documented, with more educated people having
clearly greater mobility.
Given the overriding role of education in a country’s development and
the strong educational differentials in all three population components, it
is surprising that population projections by education have rarely been at-
tempted in the past. This may be due to the fact that the multistate popula-
tion projections methods necessary for performing simultaneous projections
of subgroups (such as educational groups) that interact with one another
(have transitions from one group to another) have not yet been adopted
by all the agencies that perform projections, even though these methods
were developed at IIASA in the mid-1970s (e.g., Rogers, 1975). This, in
turn, may be due to the great momentum of institutional settings with cer-
tain mandates that may be based on somewhat outdated perceptions of the
problem.
Disregarding educational differentials in cases where they are significant
will result in unreliable, or wrong, projections. This becomes evident when
we think of the simple case in which the fertility rates remain constant in
each educational group: even if school enrollment does not change in the
future, the past increase in enrollment that was observed throughout the
developing world will automatically result in a strong change in the educa-
tional composition of the adult population over the next decades. If educated
women have fewer births and the proportion of educated women increases,
the result will be a lower total number of births rather than a homogeneous
population with constant fertility. Heterogeneity is a tricky issue if it goes
unobserved, but if we can observe the differentials, acknowledge that they
will make a difference, and have the methodology to account for this dif-
ference, there is no reason not to conduct population projections based on
education.
6In addition to providing useful information on the countries themselves,
this study strengthens the importance of the educational component in pop-
ulation projections and shows that it is feasible to study this component and
how it affects developing countries. The report is essentially structured into
four parts. In Sections 2, 3, and 4 we discuss the information available on
fertility, mortality, and education; alternative projections and a discussion
of the results are presented in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 7 the projec-
tions by country are compared with the regional probabilistic projections
for North Africa discussed in Lutz et al. (1996). Conclusions are presented
in Section 8.
2. Fertility
North Africa is a region with high but declining fertility. Fertility had been
maintained at a high level for a considerable period of time, but a decline has
begun in each country. During the 1960s and 1970s all countries in North
Africa had high fertility. The total fertility rate (TFR), which measures the
average number of children a woman would have at the end of her repro-
ductive period if she had children according to the age-specific fertility rates
prevailing during a given period, was high, generally 6 or more live births
per woman in each country (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). One explanation for
sustained high fertility is the tradition of early marriage. The mean age at
marriage was low, 17 years or less, during the 1960s and 1970s providing
the social and cultural environment for maintaining fertility at a high level.
Due to the predominance of patriarchal and extended family norms, women
were traditionally subordinate and illiterate; a teenage girl often went from
being dominated by her parental family to domination by her husband’s
family. These factors were barriers to the adoption of modern contraceptive
methods and deterrents to regulation of fertility. It is not surprising that
during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a strong anti-family-planning stance
in North Africa.
High fertility may also have been sustained by improvements in stan-
dards of living and increases in income levels. Income affects fertility in a
number of indirect ways. Chances are that a woman will not work outside
the home if her husband’s income is rising. Income would, therefore, increase
the likelihood that the wife stays at home and possibly motivates a couple to
have more children. Rising incomes often improve a family’s diet and health,
thus contributing to lower infant and child mortality, which in turn affects
7Table 1. Total fertility rates in North Africa, 1960–1992.
Change
1970–1979 to
Country 1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1992 1980–1992
Algeria 7.5 (1966) 7.2 (1977) 4.4 (1992) 2.8 (38%)
Egypt 7.1 (1960) 5.6 (1976) 3.9 (1992) 1.7 (30%)
Libya 7.2 (1964) 7.7 (1973) 7.2 (1984) 0.5 (6%)
Morocco 7.1 (1960) 6.9 (1971) 4.0 (1992) 2.9 (42%)
Sudan 6.7 (1960) 6.9 (1979) 4.9 (1990) 2.0 (29%)
Tunisia 7.2 (1966) 5.7 (1975) 3.4 (1988) 2.3 (40%)
Sources: UN (1993); Khalifa (1994); Department of Statistics, Sudan (1991).
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Figure 1. Trends in total fertility rates in North Africa, 1960–1992.
fertility. Moreover, rising incomes increase the incidence of bottle-feeding,
as a substitute for breast-feeding, which may indirectly increase fertility.
Obstacles such as the need for a dowry and the high costs of marriage and
setting up a new household tend to delay marriage, so rising incomes may
permit earlier marriage and earlier childbearing.
Recently, fertility in most countries of North Africa has started to decline
rapidly. The level of fertility in late 1980s and early 1990s was much lower
than the level in the 1960s and 1970s (Table 1 ). The largest drop occurred in
the Maghreb countries: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. High fertility levels
8Table 2. Age-specific fertility rates per 1,000 women.
Year 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR
Algeriaa
1970 114 339 388 355 282 153 42 8.4
1977 97 284 342 336 267 129 27 7.4
1981 60 256 334 274 216 115 24 6.4
1984 47 239 322 293 227 104 20 6.3
1986 35 212 263 273 212 86 17 5.5
1988 33 175 260 250 202 104 18 5.2
Egypt
1980 (WFS) 99 256 286 217 130 48 16 5.3
1988 (DHS) 72 220 243 182 118 41 6 4.4
1991 (EMCHS) 69 215 216 192 93 40 6 4.2
1992 (DHS) 63 208 222 155 89 43 6 3.9
Libya
1973 (UN) 249 407 360 285 151 66 29 7.7
1995b 110 279 313 272 190 95 20 6.4
Morocco
1962 96 305 311 293 186 107 93 6.9
1980 (WFS) 93 265 296 222 178 98 29 5.9
1992 (ENPS-II) 40 139 183 182 138 86 39 4.0
Sudan
1979 (WFS) 114 264 283 251 149 108 35 6.0
1983 (Census) 115 294 348 268 196 79 74 6.9
1990 (DHS) 69 183 240 236 157 82 25 4.9
Tunisia
1978 (WFS) 34 225 304 260 199 112 36 5.9
1984 (UN) 35 173 248 238 140 54 18 4.5
1988 (DHS) 17 131 195 176 113 41 9 3.4
aNational Board of Statistics, Algeria (1991).
bUN (1994) estimates for 1990–1995 medium variant projections.
Sources: UN (1987, 1993).
in Sudan and Egypt have also declined considerably in recent years. Only
Libya has maintained its past high fertility levels.
The declining trend in fertility can be further studied by examining
changes in age-specific fertility rates. There is a clear tendency for women to
have children early in their reproductive period (Table 2 and Figure 2 ) – this
pattern is consistent with fertility levels in developing countries. Currently,
women between ages 15 and 29 bear more than 50 percent of the children
in these countries. The concentration of fertility in the early childbearing
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Figure 2. Age-specific fertility rates in North Africa.
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period reflects early marriage and high teenage fertility, particularly during
the 1960s and 1970s. There is a downward shift in the age-specific fertility
curves for all countries. The largest shift is in the peak childbearing ages,
between 25 and 34. Factors such as increasing use of contraceptives, im-
provements in women’s education, older age at marriage, and social change
have reduced fertility even though traditional factors may have impeded this
process.
Government support for population policies and programs is gaining
momentum. It is not a coincidence that the rapid decline of fertility in
Egypt and Tunisia took place at a time when government intervention to
resolve population issues was on the rise. In these two countries the use of
family-planning methods has increased significantly during the past 15 years.
What is more important is the substantial increase in women’s education.
The high illiteracy rates prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s declined sharply
in the 1980s. For example, illiteracy rates that were above 85 percent for
women in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco during the 1960s declined to less
than 50 percent in the 1980s. Recently, the availability of education to
women in Egypt, Sudan, and Libya has also increased. However, because
of differences in access to educational services by place of residence, urban
women are likely to be more educated than rural women. The high rate of
urbanization in countries in North Africa have also contributed to reducing
fertility.
2.1 Rural/Urban fertility differentials
Place of residence (rural/urban) has a pervasive influence on fertility. In
North Africa rural women have substantially higher fertility than urban
women. According to the World Fertility Surveys (WFS) conducted in the
late 1970s, rural women in four countries in North Africa bore, on average,
2.5 more children than urban women. The fertility differential between rural
and major urban areas was 2.3 children in Egypt, 3.1 children in Morocco,
1.6 children in Sudan, and 2.2 children in Tunisia (Table 3 and Figure 3 ).[1]
Recent findings from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) give more
insights into fertility differential by place of residence. In Egypt the DHS
results for 1992 (El-Zanaty et al., 1993) show that women in rural areas
have almost twice the total fertility rate of women in urban governorates.[2]
Women in rural upper Egypt have substantially higher fertility than women
in other areas. The Sudan DHS shows that fertility is lower in urban areas
11
Table 3. Total fertility and contraceptive prevalence rates by place of
residence.
Egypt Morocco Sudan Tunisia
Place of residence TFR CPR TFR CPR TFR CPR TFR CPR
World Fertility Survey
Rural 6.1 13.0 7.0 10.0 6.4 2.0 7.0 21.0
Major urban 3.8 42.0 3.9 40.0 4.8 16.0 4.8a 43.0a
Other urban 4.9 36.0 4.8 35.0 5.7 9.0
Demographic and Health Survey
Rural 4.9 38.4 5.5 31.6 5.2 3.9 5.7 34.6
Urban 2.9 57.0 2.4 41.5 3.9 17.0 3.4 60.5
aUrban.
Sources: UN (1987:Tables 96, 99, 104); El-Zanaty et al. (1993:Tables 3.2, 5.5); Azelmat et
al. (1992:Tables 3.2, 4.5); Department of Statistics, Sudan (1991:Tables 3.1, 4.7); Institute
for National Statistics, Tunisia (1989:Tables 5.1, 6.8).
than in rural areas and that the lowest fertility is in Khartoum (TFR equal
to 3.6). The DHSs for Tunisia (Aloui et al., 1988) and Morocco (Azelmat et
al., 1992) give differences of 2.3 and 3, respectively, between rural and urban
fertility (Table 3 ).
Several compositional factors help to explain the differences between
urban and rural fertility. Urban households have better access to social
services, particularly education and health services, and to modern employ-
ment opportunities than rural households. Moreover, households in urban
areas are more likely to possess modern consumer goods. These advantages
may alter reproductive behavior and facilitate the diffusion of contraceptive
methods. Therefore, urban families are more likely to adopt modern fertility
patterns than rural families.
Rural women are far less educated than urban women. For example, in
Egypt in 1992, urban women, on average, spent five years in school compared
with less than one year for rural women. The DHS for Sudan shows that
55 percent of rural women have never attended school compared with 33
percent of urban women. Rural women have limited access to and low use
of contraceptive methods in contrast to urban women who have access to
family-planning services. The WFS and the DHS show that urban areas
have a substantially higher contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) than rural
areas (Table 3 ). It is highly probable that modern contraceptive methods
have a greater role in lowering fertility in urban areas than they do in rural
areas.
12
Morocco 1980
0
2
4
6
8
10
7.0
4.8
3.9
Sudan 1979
0
2
4
6
8
10
6.4
5.7
4.8
Tunisia 1979
0
2
4
6
8
10
7.0
4.8
Egypt 1980
0
2
4
6
8
10
6.1
4.9
3.8
Major
urban
Rural Other
urban
Rural Major
urban
Other
urban
Rural Major
urban
Rural
TF
R
TF
R
TF
R
TF
R
Major
urban
Other
urban
Figure 3. Total fertility rates by place of residence in Egypt, Morocco,
Sudan, and Tunisia according to the World Fertility Survey.
The social and cultural environment in rural areas is more conducive
to high fertility than that in urban areas. This situation is reflected in
the persistence of traditional beliefs and values and the cultural support for
women’s reproductive role. Rural women marry at an earlier age than urban
women. According to the WFS in the 1970s, the difference in the singulate
mean age at marriage (SMAM) between rural and urban women was 3.2
years in Egypt, 2.9 years in Morocco, 1.9 years in Sudan, and 1.4 years in
Tunisia.[3] More recent findings from the DHS indicate that the median age
at first marriage is on the rise and that the rural/urban difference is widening.
For women between 25 and 29, the DHS results for the Sudan give a median
age at first marriage of 23.2 years for urban women and 19.0 years for rural
women, a 4.2-year difference. With education spreading more rapidly in
urban areas than in rural areas this result is not unexpected. In addition,
fertility preferences in rural areas are higher than in urban areas. The WFS
results show that, on average, rural women in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia
in the late 1970s preferred to bear 4.8, 5.5, and 4.6 children, respectively; in
contrast, women in major urban areas preferred 3.0, 3.9, and 3.4 children,
respectively. The more recent DHS for Sudan shows that rural women prefer
13
6.3 children, while urban women favor 5.3 children (Department of Statistics,
Sudan, 1991).
2.2 Fertility and women’s education
Education plays a special role in the future of women. It is a key factor
to their autonomy and full participation in society. At the 1994 Interna-
tional Conference on Population and Development, education was singled
out as “one of the most important means of empowering women with the
knowledge, skills and self-confidence necessary to participate fully in the de-
velopment process” (UN, 1995a). Education gives every woman the chance,
the knowledge, the ability, and the potential to manipulate and control her
environment (marriage, work, fertility, and so on). Formal education pro-
vides an escape from the vicious circle experienced by many generations of
teenage girls: school dropout, household chores, early marriage, and early
and frequent pregnancies.
Education does not work alone; it is one of many societal changes that
occur in the course of development. Education influences fertility directly by
raising the age at marriage, but its indirect influence is even more important
– by changing norms and attitudes about family formation and the status of
women. Freedman’s model on fertility distinguishes between the underlying
determinants that shape values: intermediate determinants, which are the
actual norms of behavior; and direct proximate determinants, which relate
to fecundability and actual fertility control (Freedman, 1975).
A woman’s knowledge has more influence on her reproductive behavior
than her socioeconomic status. There are, for instance, no consistent re-
lationships between women’s employment and fertility. The factors listed
below link education to behavioral changes that eventually lead to lower
fertility as well as to other societal changes (McGrath, 1976; Federici et al.,
1993; Oppong, 1987; Noor, 1981; Freedman, 1987; UN, 1987). A more recent
summary of DHS results on education and fertility is given in UN (1995b).
• At a certain level of education women begin to carefully examine their
beliefs and actions and their opinions become respected in society, in
general, and in their family circles, in particular. They increasingly
have an influence on household decisions concerning expenses, family
planning, education of children, and so on. The number of children ever
born to an educated woman is probably close to her desired family size;
often this means a small number of children. Women’s education changes
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traditional values, attitudes, and norms and strengthens women’s social
status within households and in communities.
• Education delays a woman’s entrance into her reproductive life by in-
creasing the age at marriage, particularly for women with a secondary
or higher education. School attendance raises aspirations regarding a
marriage partner. The singulate mean age at marriage is highly and pos-
itively correlated to education and to several other measures of women’s
access to resources.
• Schooling provides girls with information about the outside world; it ex-
pands their limit of the horizon from the household levels, giving them
confidence in their capacities and abilities. It also increases their knowl-
edge about health issues and family planning; this knowledge raises the
possibility of birth control use and longer intervals between births.
• Education increases women’s job opportunities in the modern sector, al-
lowing them to work outside the home and to adopt life-styles that could
be incompatible with bearing many children. Therefore, women’s family-
size preferences are likely to change as they receive more education.
• Educated women are likely to expect less help from their children at
home because they themselves have been educated; they would rather
see their children attend school than stay at home. Therefore, children
are not relied on to secure the future, resulting in fewer births. As well,
in almost every country, educated women have healthier children than
uneducated women, so the survival rate of children born to an educated
woman is very high. With higher education comes higher economic
status, which results not only from women’s educational level but also
from other development factors. Improvements in economic status allows
families to make arrangements for domestic help, which enables both
parents to work outside the home.
Several conceptual models have been developed to observe the influence
of education on fertility. A classic observation of fertility and education
is that, in moving from no education to some threshold of low education,
fertility does not change and in some cases it is higher among women with
some very limited education than among those with none at all. Beyond
this threshold, fertility and education are inversely related. World Fertility
Surveys of 41 countries taken in the late 1970s and early 1980s verify this
observation.
In fact, education leads to improvements in the social status for women
and facilitates changes in fertility (UN, 1987; Casterline et al., 1984;
15
Cochrane, 1979). Empirical evidence continues to support the strong in-
verse relationship between women’s education and fertility. Countries differ
from one another with regard to the level of education (or years of school-
ing) at which fertility starts to decline (Timur, 1977). Studies also show that
access to educational services differs by residence. In addition, a particular
level of education may affect fertility in urban and rural areas differently.
As mentioned above empirical studies have shown that the inverse effects
of women’s education on fertility may not appear at the lowest educational
levels (Cochrane, 1979). Some primary education may increase rather than
decrease fertility. Highest fertility is often found not among women without
education, but among those with a few years of schooling. The positive ef-
fect of a low educational level is especially noticeable in rural areas and in
less urbanized and developing countries where per capita income is low. One
possible mechanism is that a few years of education in the least developed
countries and most inegalitarian settings may lead to a decline in breast-
feeding or improvements in health which are not offset by such effects as
marriage delay. Therefore, at the pre-demographic transition stage women’s
education may not instigate a movement toward declining fertility. Accord-
ing to Caldwell (1983), schooling of many children is economically rewarding
for parents, therefore fertility remains high.
2.3 Fertility and women’s education in North Africa
The literature on North Africa documents varying education-fertility inter-
relations. In the early 1970s fertility in Morocco was almost the same at
all levels of education (Timur, 1977). Studies of Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and
Tunisia during the 1960s and early 1970s document a different pattern: large
fertility declines in response to increases of a few years in women’s educa-
tion. In Egypt during the 1960s women age 30 or older who had completed
primary education had 1.3 fewer children than women in the same age group
with no education (Timur, 1977). For Algerian women who had completed
their fertile period, those with primary education had approximately 2 fewer
children than women with no education. A 1975 survey of fertility and fam-
ily planning in Sudan conducted by Caldwell (1983) as part of the Changing
African Family Project unraveled fertility differences by level of education
in urban Sudan. The age-standardized mean number of children ever born
to women with no education was only slightly different from that born to
women with a few years of education. Women with secondary education had
2 fewer children than women with no education (Richard et al., 1982).
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Table 4. Fertility by women’s education according to the WFS and the
DHS.
Egypt Morocco Sudan Tunisia
WFS,a years of education
0 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.3
1–3 6.4 5.2 5.6 5.9
4–6 6.2 4.4 5.0 6.0
7+ 3.8 4.2 3.1 3.9
DHS,b level of education
No education 5.0 4.9 5.5 5.1
Primary 3.9 2.4 4.7 3.9
Secondary+ 2.9 2.0 3.3 2.4
All levels 3.9 4.0 4.6 4.3
aTMFR for Egypt and Tunisia and TFR for Sudan and Morocco.
bTFR.
Source: UN (1987:Tables 112, 115, 122).
Data from the WFS and DHS provide comprehensive and convincing
evidence in support of education-fertility interrelationships. On average,
women with seven or more years of schooling tend to reduce their fertility
by about three children, whereas women with only a few years of schooling
have slightly higher fertility than women with no education (UN, 1987).
Results from the WFS of Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia show large
fertility differences by level of education (Table 4 ). Women with no schooling
have substantially higher fertility than women with seven or more years of
education. The difference between these two levels of education amounts to
two and three or more children when we consider TFR and total marital
fertility rate (TMFR). It is important to note that TMFR and TFR are
age-standardized period measures.
The 1991 Maternal and Child Health Survey (MCHS) conducted in
Egypt provides more insights into education-fertility interactions. Control-
ling for age at first marriage, the survey found that women with no education
have systematically higher fertility than women with secondary or higher-
level education (Hosam Eldin, 1994). The same differential pattern prevails
when we control the use of contraceptive methods. Among ever users of
family-planning methods, women with no education have, on average, 5.7
children ever born, compared with 4.2 children born to women with primary
education and 3.0 children born to women with secondary or higher-level
education. The DHS for Egypt (El-Zanaty et al., 1993) shows low fertility
at high levels of education (TFR equal to 5.03 for no education, 3.98 for
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some primary education, 3.03 for completed primary or some secondary ed-
ucation, and 2.91 for completed secondary or higher education). The Sudan
Demographic and Health Survey (Department of Statistics, Sudan, 1991)
documents a similar large differential pattern by level of education. Women
who received a secondary education have, on average, 3.3 children, whereas
women with no schooling have 5.5 children.
Of the countries in North Africa, Sudan has the weakest family-planning
policy and women’s educational program. Sudan also has the highest de-
sired fertility rate in North Africa. WFS results show that women with no
education in Sudan had the highest desired fertility. The desired family size
of women with seven or more years of schooling declines by 1.5 children.
Recent results from the Sudan Demographic and Health Survey confirm this
high desired fertility. The SDHS report states:
[A]lthough fertility in Sudan is low compared with most sub-Saharan coun-
tries, the desire for children is strong. One in three married women wants
to have another child within two years and the same proportion wants an-
other child in two or more years; only one in four married women wants
to stop childbearing. The proportion of women who want no more chil-
dren increases with family size and age. The average ideal family size,
5.9 children, exceeds the total fertility rate by approximately one child.
Older women are more likely to want large families than younger women,
and women just beginning their families say they want to have about five
children. [Department of Statistics, 1991:xvii]
This phenomenon in Sudan requires further investigation and analysis.
2.4 Fertility and family-planning policies
Fertility and family-planning policies are determined, in part, by each gov-
ernment. They reflect the government’s understanding of population issues.
At the 1974 international population conference held in Bucharest, all del-
egates from North Africa were against family planning as a method for re-
solving population problems. Ten years later, in 1984, the political stand of
these governments changed, and in 1994 some countries were in an advanced
stage of population policy development. Tunisia and Egypt were the first
countries in North Africa to express concern about fertility, to set fertility
targets, and to specify measures and plans to achieve them.
In Tunisia the government restricted polygamy in 1956 and introduced
family planning and adopted a flexible stand on abortion in the early 1960s.
These measures were strengthened by improving women’s education and
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increasing women’s participation in the modern sector. The official stand of
the Egyptian government progressed from skepticism to certainty. During
the 1960s and 1970s population growth and its ramifications were seen as
long-term problems, undeniably important, but neither pressing nor urgent
(Waterbury, 1975). Population issues were of secondary importance. This
situation has changed considerably in recent years. Today, the government
in Egypt supports population and family planning more actively than ever
before. Consequently, the use of contraceptive methods increased to about
47 percent in 1992, 37 percentage points more than in 1960.
Compared with Tunisia and Egypt, fertility and family-planning policies
in Morocco and Algeria are relatively new. In Morocco the government
started to support family planning in 1968 for women age 28 or older with
at least four children (Sayed, 1993). In Algeria the government did not
endorse family planning until 1983 when it took steps to ensure that services
were available to the entire population. The population programs in Sudan
and Libya are also very new. In Sudan there is as yet no clear agreement
on the country’s population issues. While some observers express alarm
at the rapid rate of population growth, others applaud it as a means to
solve what they claim is becoming a severe problem of labor shortage in
the agricultural sector. Fertility in Sudan declined primarily because of
increasing age at marriage which was due to increasing school attendance
and male migration. However, the slow pace of fertility decline is mainly
due to women’s low educational level.
2.5 Future prospects
The high fertility sustained over the 1960s and 1970s in North Africa has
produced a young age structure and has strengthened the future momentum
of population growth. Nevertheless, the potential for structural changes
in these countries is great because of modernization efforts, internal social
change, political instability, peace in the Middle East, and the rise of reli-
gious fundamentalism. Therefore, there is considerable uncertainty about
future fertility levels. The strong population growth momentum will have
a great effect on the future demographic situation in countries of North
Africa. Potential mothers for several decades to come have already been
born. Therefore, the recent decline in fertility in North Africa will not have
its full demographic impact for several years. With sustained high fertil-
ity the age composition of the population will be dominated by the young,
those who are age 15 or younger. The social consequences of this young age
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structure are inevitable, particularly added pressure on services and increas-
ing demand for education.
The decline in fertility is not uniform within the countries. Most of the
decline is in urban areas. Due to differences in desired family size, contra-
ceptive use, and women’s educational levels, the potential for further decline
in fertility varies considerably by place of residence. Fertility differences by
women’s educational level are enormous. Findings from the WFS and the
DHS show large fertility declines in response to an increase of only a few
years in women’s education.
Urban areas in North Africa will continue to play a leading role in fertility
change. However, the greatest future demographic challenge for governments
in North Africa is in rural areas where fertility is the highest and women’s
education is the lowest. Government activities in rural areas and the official
stand on population policies will play a crucial role in modulating reproduc-
tive behavior and shaping the future pattern of rural fertility. Population
policies and social programs influence reproductive decisions of couples in
various ways. For example, the use of modern contraceptive methods is de-
termined to a large extent by each government’s stand on population issues.
Government social policies and programs in many countries have successfully
helped couples to achieve their fertility and health aspirations, primarily be-
cause these programs have gained social acceptance and direct government
support. In other countries couples have failed to achieve some of these as-
pirations not because they are helpless victims of their own behavior, but
because of a lack of government and public support and social obstacles.
The downward trend in fertility in urban areas is irreversible, partic-
ularly in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. In the 1980s Tunisia’s population
targets were to reach an annual growth rate of 1.8 percent by 2001 and 1.1
percent by 2021 primarily through increases in contraceptive use and a social
program to improve education and the status of women (Sayed, 1993). Fer-
tility in Tunisia is likely to reach replacement level before any other country
in the region. The government in Egypt has set a national goal of 2 children
per couple by the year 2015. Fertility has been projected to decline from 3.9
in 1992 to 2.9 in 2005 to 2.1 in 2015 (Khalifa, 1994). To achieve replace-
ment fertility contraceptive use must reach a high level of about 74 percent.
However, the main challenge for realizing these national goals lies in rural
areas, particularly in upper Egypt, where fertility is high and the potential
for decline is the greatest.
Future fertility trends are associated with substantial uncertainties in
Algeria, Libya, and Sudan. With the spread of pronatalistic attitudes and
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programs, fertility in Algeria and Sudan may increase, particularly in rural
areas. Fertility increases are realistic possibilities in many Arab countries.
For example, fertility in Egypt increased in the late 1970s and mid-1980s,
before it declined in the late 1980s. Another possible scenario is that fertility
in these countries will follow a downward pattern in response to social devel-
opment, improvements in women’s education, and increased contraception
use. However, replacement fertility will be very difficult to achieve, partic-
ularly in rural areas. In Libya, the current unabated high fertility level is
unlikely to continue into the future. This country’s changing economy, rapid
urbanization, and improvements in women’s status and education are likely
to bring about a moderate decline in fertility.
3. Mortality
Unlike fertility and family planning, mortality involves fewer controversial
issues, probably because of its lower sensitivity to cultural and religious
factors. Nevertheless, health and mortality are closely linked to social de-
velopment and the quality of life. Social development activities and services
are often organized by place of residence. Rural residents have poor health
and high mortality levels primarily because they do not have access to med-
ical services. Mortality is directly linked to the disease environment. Many
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, are influenced by ecological zones
and local climate conditions. Environmental hazards at the global and lo-
cal levels, such as ozone-layer depletion and air pollution, may also directly
affect health and mortality. Therefore, mortality and health are more likely
to be sensitive to environmental degradation than fertility (Lutz, 1994a). It
is important to consider these aspects when looking at the role of mortality
in future population trends.
Mortality in the countries of North Africa has improved quite rapidly in
the past three decades (Table 5 and Figure 4 ). The most rapid decline has
been in the four Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia).
During the period from 1950–1955 to 1990–1995 life expectancy at birth for
females increased by about 24.1 years in Algeria and 23.6 years in Tunisia; for
males life expectancy increased by 23.9 and 22.8 years, respectively. In Egypt
life expectancy at birth increased by 6.9 years for males and females between
1976 and 1986; thereafter (1986–1991), females gained slightly more years
of life than males. With improvements in women’s status and educational
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Table 5. Life expectancy at birth by sex in North Africa.
Algeria Egypt Libyab Moroccob Sudan Tunisia
Period F M F M F M F M F M F M
1950–55 44.2 42.1 43.6 41.2 43.9 41.9 43.9 41.9 39.1 36.3 45.1 44.1
1955–60 46.8 44.7 46.1 43.7 46.6 44.3 46.6 44.3 40.1 37.3 47.6 46.6
1960–65 49.8 47.3 48.6 46.2 49.2 46.7 49.2 46.7 41.1 38.3 50.1 49.1
1965–70 52.5 50.4 51.0 48.5 51.8 49.0 51.8 49.0 43.1 40.3 52.6 51.6
1970–75 55.5 53.5 53.4 50.8 54.5 51.4 54.5 51.4 45.1 42.3 56.1 55.1
1975–80 58.5 56.5 55.3 52.9 57.5 54.1 57.5 54.1 48.1 45.3 60.6 59.6
1980–85 62.0 60.0 57.8 55.3 60.0 56.6 60.0 56.6 50.6 47.8 63.6 62.6
1985–90 66.0 64.0 62.3 59.8 62.5 59.1 62.5 59.1 52.4 49.6 66.4 64.9
1990–95a 68.3 66.0 64.8 62.4 65.0 61.6 65.0 61.6 54.4 51.6 68.7 66.9
aUN (1994) estimates for 1990–1995, medium variant projections.
bThe 1992 and 1994 revision of the UN World Prospects (UN, 1992 and 1994) provide
exactly the same figures on life expectancy at birth by sex for Libya and Morocco between
1950–1955 and 1990–1995. These data were thought problematic by the authors and were
not analyzed in the text nor plotted on Figure 4.
Source: UN (1993:Table 7).
levels, the spread of family-planning programs, and declining fertility rates,
women’s life expectancy is likely to continue to improve.
Mortality improvement in Egypt between 1976 and 1986 was greater in
the rural population than in the urban population. Life expectancy at birth
increased by 8.2 and 7.4 years for rural males and females and by 5.0 and
5.8 years for their urban counterparts. Over this period the rural population
gained three more years of life than the urban population. Cities may be
unhealthy to live in; however, the proximity of rural areas to urban cen-
ters may facilitate the rural inhabitants’ access to modern health facilities.
Therefore, it is possible that these improvements in mortality are distorted
somewhat by the classification of death in a place other than the usual place
of residence.
Mortality in Sudan has declined slowly, and its level is still high. Life
expectancy at birth has improved by about 7.3 years for males and females
over the period from 1970–1975 to 1985–1990. Infectious diseases, particu-
larly malaria, are still widespread in Sudan; therefore, this country’s small
decline in mortality is not unexpected. Health improvements in Sudan are
hampered by several obstacles. Political and social development efforts over
a considerable period of time are needed to repair the damage caused by
three decades of civil war and frequent famines and droughts.
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Figure 4. Trends in life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate in
North Africa.
Infants and the elderly are at high risk of death. Therefore, death rates
are usually higher at infancy and old age than at other ages. As in other
regions, age-specific mortality rates in North Africa diminish rapidly to age
4 then slowly to ages 5–9. Thereafter, mortality stays at a very low level
to the 45–49 age group. Mortality rates are very low, usually below 10 per
1,000 population, for children aged 5–9 and 10–14 and for adults aged 15–49.
The level then increases at an accelerating rate. Starting approximately at
the 50–54 age group for males and 55–59 age group for females, mortality
rates increase to levels above 10 per 1,000 population. Thereafter the rates
increase to high double digits in the 70–74 age group and to three digits, in
most cases exceeding the infant mortality rate, in the open-end age intervals
(75+ and 80+).
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Table 6. Infant mortality rates in North Africa.
Period Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Sudan Tunisia
1950–1955 185 200 185 180 185 175
1955–1960 175 183 170 170 170 163
1960–1965 160 175 150 155 150 155
1965–1970 150 170 130 138 130 138
1970–1975 132 150 117 122 110 120
1975–1980 112 131 107 110 97 88
1980–1985 88 115 97 97 92 71
1985–1990 67 81 82 82 85 49
1990–1995a 55 67 68 68 78 43
aUN (1994) estimates for 1990–1995, medium variant projections.
Source: UNECA (1992:Table 13).
Infants are highly vulnerable to the risk of death. Infant mortality is a
very sensitive indicator of social development. As the standard of living goes
up, so does the average level of health; in fact, the health of babies improves
faster and earlier than the health of adults (Weeks, 1994). Infant mortality
was high and declined slowly in all countries in North Africa during the
1950s and 1960s. Since the 1970s it has declined more rapidly (Table 6 ).
The trend of infant mortality rates shows a rapid downward pattern.
Pregnant and postpartum women are another high-risk group. In 1986
the WHO estimated maternal mortality in Africa to be 640 per 100,000 live
births. Maternal mortality is considered a major public-health issue in all
North African countries, particularly in rural areas. Recent studies indicate
that the rate of maternal mortality in Egypt was high during the 1960s and
1970s, but it declined to 320 per 100,000 live births in 1986 and to 266 in 1991
(Makhlouf et al., 1994). The maternal mortality rate was 332 in Morocco
in 1992 and 552 in Sudan in the 1983–1989 period. With increasing age at
marriage and increased use of contraceptives, maternal mortality is likely to
decline further in the future.
Gender differences in mortality have been well established worldwide.
Generally, women live longer than men primarily because of biological and
social factors. Higher rates of heart disease for men combined with men’s
higher risk behavior account for most of the differences in the gender gap
(Weeks, 1994). Data from North Africa show very small differences in life
expectancy at birth by sex (Table 5 ). For the most part the gender difference
ranges between 1 and 2.8 years over the entire period from 1950 to 1990.
The gender difference in life expectancy at birth in Egypt indicates that
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women outlived men by about 6 years between 1936 and 1949 and by about
2.5 years from the 1950s to the 1980s. In 1991 this difference increased to
3.4 years.
Egypt is the only country in North Africa for which gender mortality
by place of residence (urban/rural) is available. The gender difference in life
expectancy at birth in urban areas was 2.3 years in 1976; it increased to
about 3 years in 1986. By contrast, the difference in rural areas was about
3.1 in 1976 and declined to 2.3 in 1986. These results suggest that the gender
gap is widening in urban areas and narrowing in rural ones.
The mortality decline in each country in North Africa is impressive.
All governments in the region have implemented maternal- and child-health
programs based on simple, low-cost health technology. For example, immu-
nization and oral rehydration therapy have become widespread. The demo-
graphic impact of these health programs has not yet been fully assessed.
However, these programs are likely to lead to a substantial decline in infant
and child mortality. Infant mortality may decline to below 20 deaths per
1,000 live births in Tunisia and Egypt and to below 40 in Morocco, Algeria,
and Libya. In Sudan infant mortality is likely to fluctuate at a high level for
the near future primarily because of poor health conditions and poverty.
4. Education
4.1 Education and development
Education is an important factor in development. Future educational
achievements of a given population will be decisive in determining that pop-
ulation’s chances of developing and prospering. Schumacher (1973) summa-
rizes the role of education in the following way:
[D]evelopment does not start with goods; it starts with people and their
education, organization and discipline. Without these three, all resources
remain latent, untapped, potential. Here lies the reason why development
cannot be an act of creation, why it cannot be ordered, bought, compre-
hensively planned: why it requires a process of evolution. Education does
not “jump”.
It does not “jump” because its pattern of change is a slow one, with
the long momentum characteristic of demographic changes. Each person
who enters adulthood with a certain level of education will remain a part of
the adult population for, on average, four to six decades. During this time,
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each person’s level of schooling influences the educational achievement of the
adult population.
As pointed out in a recent United Nations Industrial Development Orga-
nization (UNIDO) study, education increases human capital and the quality
of life (Forstner and Ballance, 1990). With higher education, or higher hu-
man capital, people’s “well-being is enhanced by gains in labor productivity,
and by increases in entrepreneurial efficiency in acquiring information, and
in adjusting to the disequilibrium inherent in the process of modernization
as it affects farm and non-farm production, household production” (Schultz,
1979:343). Formal education is only a part of human capital as “[t]he qual-
ity of population in a country is usually taken to mean its state of health,
its nutritional standards, and the level of skills and competencies” (Blaug,
1979:361). Education directly increases skills and competencies, but it can
also improve people’s awareness of the need for better health and diets and
is therefore an essential part of increasing human capital.
Growth model studies by economists give a theoretical basis for these
observations (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). These studies emphasize the
role of human capital in the development of new technologies, innovations,
and patents, which have been identified as the long-term engines of eco-
nomic growth. An economy that has very little human capital in the form
of well-educated and skilled individuals will need to use all of this capital
in the production sector; therefore, few will be available to develop new
technologies. Yet an active research and development sector is what drives
the economic growth of a country, including its comparative advantage in
international world markets. Indeed, extreme proponents of the value of
human capital (e.g., Simon, 1981) argue that it is the “ultimate resource”
that determines the level of welfare in a country, and the globe as a whole.
Demographic research has shown that education is one of the most
important links between population growth and development (Coale and
Hoover, 1958). Rapid population growth implies a young age structure re-
quiring large educational outlays. These outlays reduce the resources avail-
able for other investments that could directly benefit economic growth. Even
if educational outlays are regarded as investments, the fact that there is a
time lag between the initial investment and the increased productivity of the
educated worker implies that there are costs to economic growth.
Some authors (e.g., Todaro, 1981) argue that the distribution of expen-
diture between basic and higher education favors tertiary education in many
countries. This situation results in increased inequality, as tertiary educa-
tion for a few is expanded at the cost of basic education for many, and in
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Table 7. Distribution of student population in the countries of North Africa.
First level Second level
Total % female Sex ratio Total % female Sex ratio
Algeria
1980 3,118,827 41.92 1.39 1,028,294 38.53 1.60
1985 3,481,288 43.55 1.30 1,823,392 41.54 1.41
1987 3,801,651 44.26 1.26 2,082,646 41.65 1.40
1988 3,911,388 44.52 1.25 2,111,292 42.13 1.37
1989 4,027,612 44.66 1.24 2,162,469 42.62 1.35
1990 4,189,152 44.83 1.23 2,175,580 43.36 1.31
1991 4,357,352 45.12 1.22 2,232,780 43.98 1.27
1992 4,436,363 45.35 1.21 2,305,198 44.57 1.24
Egypt
1980 4,662,816 40.23 1.49 2,929,168 36.92 1.71
1985 6,214,250 43.20 1.31 3,826,601 39.57 1.53
1987 7,034,617 42.77 1.34 4,130,812 40.80 1.45
1988 7,343,716 44.18 1.26 4,180,754 41.35 1.42
1989 6,578,126 44.61 1.24 5,286,776 42.50 1.35
1990 6,964,306 44.35 1.25 5,507,257 43.24 1.31
1991 6,541,725 44.98 1.22 5,284,174 44.58 1.24
Libya
1980 662,843 47.46 1.11 296,197 40.16 1.49
1981
1982
1985 1,011,952 47.00 1.13 143,113 47.27 1.12
1991 1,238,986 47.91 1.09 215,508 56.31 0.78
inefficiency, because most of the costs of tertiary education are borne by the
society while most of the benefits accrue to the individual. This theory is
supported by the situation of many developing countries in the early 1970s.
This situation occurred in Egypt, where an education explosion at the sec-
ondary and university levels had created a mismatch between the educational
profile of the labor force and the structure of employment opportunities gen-
erated by rapid industrial growth. The result was high unemployment rates
among graduates with consequent economic and social tensions.
This part of the report provides a succinct description of the educa-
tional systems in the countries of North Africa. It describes each country’s
system and structure. It also presents the role of the system in improving
educational attainment and eradicating illiteracy. The analyses highlight dif-
ferences in educational attainment by region and sex (Table 7 ). Disparities
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Table 7. Continued.
General educationa Third level
Total % female Sex ratio Total % female Sex ratio
Algeria
1980 4,147,121 41.08 1.43 79,351 26.48 2.78
1985 5,304,680 42.86 1.33 132,057 31.47 2.18
1987 5,884,297 43.34 1.31 180,755 33.54 1.98
1988 6,022,680 43.68 1.29
1989 6,190,081 43.95 1.28
1990 6,364,732 44.33 1.26
1991 6,590,132 44.73 1.24
1992 6,741,561 45.08 1.22
Egypt
1980 7,591,984 38.95 1.57 715,701 31.52 2.17
1985 10,040,851 41.82 1.39 854,584 29.78 2.36
1987 11,165,429 42.04 1.38 875,033 32.69 2.06
1988 11,524,470 43.15 1.32 761,539 33.46 1.99
1989 11,864,902 43.67 1.29 733,275 34.04 1.94
1990 12,471,563 43.86 1.28 708,417 34.54 1.90
1991 11,825,899 44.80 1.23
Libya
1980 959,040 45.21 1.21 20,166 25.27 2.96
1981 23,767 25.56 2.91
1982 27,535 25.68 2.89
1985 1,155,065 47.03 1.13
1991 1,454,494 49.15 1.03 72,899 45.73 1.19
aGeneral education refers to first and second levels together.
exist in many countries because education services are unequally distributed
and of unequal quality by place of residence (rural/urban) and administra-
tive units. Therefore, educational systems may have differential impacts on
various aspects of development and social change. Their effect on fertility
and migration in urban areas, for example, may be different from their effect
on these components in rural areas. Such differential impacts of education
are a subject of separate research. Here we focus on gender differences and
differences by place of residence.
4.2 Educational systems and policies in North Africa
Educational systems in North Africa are hierarchical. At the bottom level
primary schools provide basic knowledge on various subjects, and at the top
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Table 7. Continued.
First level Second level
Total % female Sex ratio Total % female Sex ratio
Morocco
1980 2,172,289 37.01 1.70 797,110 37.72 1.65
1985 2,279,887 38.21 1.62 1,201,858 39.50 1.53
1986 2,227,960 38.37 1.61 1,280,701 39.40 1.54
1987 2,176,847 38.63 1.59 1,347,202 39.70 1.52
1988 2,110,719 38.93 1.57 1,349,792 39.66 1.52
1989 2,163,185 39.43 1.54 1,378,469 40.13 1.49
1990 2,483,691 39.84 1.51 1,,123,531 40.84 1.45
1991 2,578,566 40.19 1.49 1,168,918 40.58 1.46
1992 2,727,833 40.54 1.47 1,207,743 41.01 1.44
Sudan
1980 1,464,227 40.37 1.48 384,194 36.89 1.71
1985 1,738,341 40.44 1.47 556,587 42.29 1.36
1986
1987
1989
1990 2,042,743 42.79 1.34 731,624 43.48 1.30
1991 2,168,180 43.01 1.33 718,298 44.17 1.26
Tunisia
1980 1,054,027 41.58 1.41 293,351 36.50 1.74
1985 1,291,490 44.51 1.25 457,630 40.12 1.49
1987 1,345,921 44.73 1.24 385,680 42.94 1.33
1988 1,333,490 45.13 1.22 455,708 42.66 1.34
1989 1,376,519 45.48 1.20 546,953 42.54 1.35
1990 1,405,665 45.81 1.18 564,540 43.12 1.32
1991 1,426,215 46.07 1.17 589,674 44.21 1.26
1992 1,440,960 46.39 1.16 639,403 44.96 1.22
universities and higher education provide specialized training. These sys-
tems have several potential functions, and they fulfill noneconomic needs,
both societal and personal. They help an individual develop his or her per-
sonality, build his or her career, and obtain better jobs. Education enhances
the capacity to accept new ideas and values and changes a child’s perception
of life and his or her role in society. In fact, educational systems prepare
children to have constructive roles in society. For nations and states, educa-
tional systems are important for human resources development, transfer of
knowledge, and diffusion of technological innovations (Noor, 1981). Societies
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Table 7. Continued.
General education Third level
Total % female Sex ratio Total % female Sex ratio
Morocco
1980 2,969,399 37.20 1.69
1985 3,481,745 38.66 1.59 181,087 32.33 2.09
1986 3,508,661 38.75 1.58
1987 3,524,049 39.04 1.56 213,570 33.64 1.97
1988 3,460,511 39.21 1.55 232,071 35.11 1.85
1989 3,541,654 39.70 1.52 239,923 36.32 1.75
1990 3,607,222 40.15 1.49 221,217 36.17 1.76
1991 3,747,484 40.31 1.48
1992 3,935,576 40.68 1.46
Sudan
1980 1,848,421 39.65 1.52 28,788 27.06 2.70
1985 2,294,928 40.89 1.45 41,594 35.64 1.81
1986 39,843 37.43 1.67
1987 34,647 38.28 1.61
1989 60,134 40.18 1.49
1990 2,774,367 42.97 1.33
1991 2,886,478 43.30 1.31
Tunisia
1980 1,347,378 40.47 1.47 31,827 29.65 2.37
1985 1,749,120 43.36 1.31 41,594 35.64 1.81
1987 1,731,601 44.33 1.26 43,797 37.23 1.69
1988 1,789,198 44.50 1.25 54,466 37.81 1.64
1989 1,923,472 44.64 1.24 62,658 38.29 1.61
1990 1,970,205 45.04 1.22 68,535 39.38 1.54
1991 2,015,889 45.53 1.20 76,097 40.52 1.47
1992 2,080,363 45.95 1.18 87,780 41.15 1.43
Source: UNESCO (1992, 1994:Tables 3.4, 3.8, and 3.12).
are greatly empowered when their members (men and women) acquire edu-
cation and knowledge.
Educational systems also provide statistics through a process in which
schools report to local government units which, in turn, report to the national
government. These data give information on enrollment, graduates, teach-
ers, classrooms, and so on. Usually the data are published in national reports
and demographic yearbooks. In addition censuses and national surveys, such
as the DHS, often include data on the educational characteristics of the pop-
ulation measured by level and/or completed years of schooling. The United
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) pub-
lishes statistics gathered from official replies to UNESCO questionnaires and
special surveys and from official reports and publications. Analyses in this
section are based on data compiled from these different sources. It should be
noted that education data published in census volumes and national statisti-
cal yearbooks are difficult to compare because of variations in the population
covered, the definitions employed, and the completeness and accuracy of re-
porting. However, we found few discrepancies between UNESCO statistics
and education statistics published in the statistical yearbooks of the coun-
tries in North Africa.[4]
Algeria
The 1976 reforms have proved to be a milestone in the history of education
in Algeria. These reforms set the educational system in Algeria on the prin-
ciples of socialism that were strongly advocated by the government during
the 1970s. The mission of the system is to prepare children and citizens for
productive active life, to help them acquire scientific knowledge, to respond
to popular demands for justice and progress, and to raise the individual’s
consciousness of the homeland (National Board of Statistics, Algeria, 1991).
The school charter states that all Algerians have the right to an education;
education is compulsory for all children between 6 and 16 years old; it is
free for all citizens; and lessons are in Arabic. These reforms, coupled with
a good economy during the 1970s, have enabled Algeria to expand its ed-
ucational system substantially. The number of pupils and enrollment rates
have increased significantly.
The system of education in Algeria, which is under the authority and
guidance of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, is
divided into three levels: fundamental, secondary, and higher education.
Fundamental education extends over nine years in three stages of schooling:
the first stage from year 1 to year 3, the second stage from year 4 to year
6, and the third stage from year 7 to year 9. The first and second stages
are equivalent to first-level education defined by UNESCO. The third stage
is called intermediate education. Students who successfully complete the
third stage of fundamental education are eligible to compete for entrance
into secondary schools. Intermediate education and secondary education are
equivalent to UNESCO’s second-level education. There are three types of
secondary schools in Algeria: general secondary schools, which last a three-
year period; specialized secondary schools, also last a three-year period; and
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technological and professional secondary schools, which last between one
and four years. Students who successfully complete secondary education
compete for entrance into the institutes of higher education (universities,
high schools, and higher technological institutes); this is the third-level of
education defined by UNESCO.
The distribution of the student population by level of education indi-
cates that the system of education in Algeria is broadly based. Of all stu-
dents in general education, those in fundamental education make up about
66 percent (23 percent in intermediate schools and 11 percent in secondary
schools).[5] Students in higher education (universities and institutions of
higher education) constitute between 2.7 percent and 3.5 percent of all stu-
dents in Algeria. The student population has grown rapidly. The number of
students enrolled in schools in general education has increased from slightly
more than 4 million in 1980 to about 6.7 million in 1992 (see Table 7 ). In
fact, the student population in 1990 was more than three times its size in
1970. Students made up 14.7 percent of the population in 1970 and 26.8
percent in 1987. At the first level, the number of pupils has increased from
about 1.9 million in 1970 to 3.1 million in 1980 and 4.4 million in 1992
(Table 7 ). The number of students in secondary schools and institutions of
higher education has also grown rapidly.
Associated with the growth of the student population in Algeria are
changes in the sex composition. There were only 363 female students out of
every 1,000 students at all levels of education in 1970, compared with 431
in 1987 and 442 in 1990. Changes in the sex composition of students are
interesting when we consider each level of education separately. At the level
of fundamental education, the ratio of male to female students has declined
from 1.67 in 1970 to 1.21 in 1992. The sex composition of the student
population has also changed at the secondary level; the sex ratio declined
from 2.50 in 1970 to 1.24 in 1992. The most profound change in the sex
composition has occurred in the institutions of higher education where the
sex ratio has declined from about 4.00 in 1970 to 1.98 in 1987 and to 1.49
in 1992. These changes in the sex composition of the student population
indicate a significant increase in the number of female students at all levels
of education. A direct consequence of this is the decline in the gender gap
in education.
Gender differences in education could be further studied by examining
age-specific enrollment rates. These are the proportion of students enrolled
in all levels of education in each age group. Table 8 shows that enrollment
rates at each age are higher for males than for females. While these rates
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Table 8. Age-specific enrollment rates in Algeria, Libya, and Sudan by sex.
Age Males Females Total Difference (M-F)
Algeria 1987
5–6 0.5550 0.4810 0.5188 0.0740
7–9 0.9999 0.8614 0.9321 0.1385
10–12 0.9498 0.7550 0.8544 0.1948
13–15 0.8056 0.5866 0.6997 0.2190
16–18 0.4335 0.3147 0.3746 0.1188
19–21 0.1857 0.1217 0.1538 0.0640
22–24 0.0591 0.0256 0.0425 0.0335
Libya 1984
6 0.4636 0.4393 0.4516 0.0243
7–9 0.9622 0.9300 0.9464 0.0322
10–12 0.9794 0.9193 0.9498 0.0601
13–15 0.9645 0.7624 0.8658 0.2021
16–18 0.8012 0.4912 0.6492 0.3100
19–21 0.4178 0.2165 0.3191 0.2013
22–24 0.1782 0.0584 0.1201 0.1198
Sudan 1983
7–9 0.3450 0.2985 0.3227 0.0465
10–12 0.5008 0.4184 0.4620 0.0824
13–15 0.4258 0.3491 0.3898 0.0767
16–18 0.2859 0.1985 0.2430 0.0874
19–21 0.1760 0.0831 0.1284 0.0929
22–24 0.0872 0.0414 0.0640 0.0458
Sources: National Board of Statistics, Algeria (1991); Department of Statistics and Census,
Libya (1984); Department of Statistics, Sudan (1989).
reach a peak at ages 7–9, the gender gap (the difference between them)
reaches its peak at ages 10–12. This is most likely because more girls than
boys who complete primary education do not proceed to intermediate and
higher levels of schooling. Also, it may be possible that there was an under-
count of the female student population in the 1987 census.
One outcome of the educational progress in Algeria is declining gender
disparities. Another outcome is that illiteracy rates declined from 73.6 per-
cent in 1970 to 50.4 percent in 1987 among people age 15 or older. During
this same period illiteracy rates declined from 58.2 to 38.6 for males and from
87.4 to 64.2 for females. Illiteracy rates by place of residence in 1970 were
42.0 percent and 74.2 percent for urban males and females, respectively;
for their counterparts in rural areas these rates were 66.5 percent and 94
percent, respectively. In 1987 the rates were 29.5 percent and 56.2 percent
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for urban males and urban females, respectively, and 55.8 percent and 87.2
percent for rural males and rural females, respectively. It is apparent that
urban men have the highest literacy rates, followed by rural men, urban
women, and rural women. This order indicates that women in both urban
and rural areas are the most disadvantaged groups in Algeria. Therefore,
more must be done to narrow the gender gap, to reduce illiteracy among
rural and urban women, and to encourage women to proceed to secondary
and higher levels of education.
Egypt
Egypt leads in educational attainment, not only among the countries of
North Africa, but also in the Arab world. The history of formal education
in Egypt goes back more than a thousand years when the Al-Azhar started
to provide religious instructions for children and adults.[6] Formal educa-
tion started in Egypt well before the colonial period. In this respect Egypt is
unique among the countries in the region. The most well-known educational
policies were introduced during Nasser’s regime (1952–1970) when the July
revolution introduced major reforms in Egypt. The constitution stipulates
that all Egyptians have a right to education, and it must be provided free in
government schools at all levels. According to the constitution, the funda-
mental objectives of education are to build an Egyptian character capable of
facing the future, to establish a productive society, to effect comprehensive
development, and to prepare generations of scientists (Soliman, 1994).
The current system of education in Egypt consists of three levels: basic,
secondary, and universities and higher institutes. At the basic level edu-
cation is compulsory. According to education law number 139, enacted in
1981, all six-year-old children must attend grade 1 in primary schools. Ba-
sic education runs for an eight-year period divided into five years of primary
education (Ibtida’ai) and three years of preparatory education (Aidadi). Sec-
ondary education (Thanawi) consists of general, industrial, agricultural, and
commercial schools. The duration of secondary general education is three
years. Each of the remaining three types of secondary education offers the
possibility of either a three- or five-year curriculum. Higher-level education
is provided in 11 universities in Egypt and in a large number of institutions of
higher education (both private and public) offering two- and five-year courses
in various specializations. The Ministry of Education, which organizes and
oversees the educational system, the Al-Azhar, and the private sector pro-
vide educational services at all levels. Most students enroll in public schools.
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For example, in 1990–1991, 89.1 percent of all students in general education
were in public-sector schools. The remaining students were in the Al-Azhar
(6.7 percent) and the private-sector (4.2 percent) schools.
The principal objective of the educational policy is to expand educa-
tional services to achieve universal primary education and eradicate illiter-
acy. During the Nasser and Sadat regimes, the policy favored expanding
higher education (Hansen, 1991). These policies have undeniably led to a
tremendous increase in the number of students. Nonetheless, the overall
educational attainment in Egypt is low, and illiteracy rates are still high.
Also, there are substantial disparities by province and sex. In this section
we attempt to explain this paradox.
Education data indicate that the number of students in general educa-
tion in Egypt increased from about 7.6 million in 1980 to 12.5 million in 1990
(Table 7 ). At the first level (primary education) the number of pupils in-
creased from about 4.7 million in 1980 to 6.9 million in 1990. Quite recently
Egypt achieved nearly universal primary education. The gross enrollment
rate in primary schools increased from 90.0 percent in 1986–1987 to 97.2 per-
cent in 1990–1991. At the second level (preparatory and secondary schools)
the number of students also increased substantially from about 2.9 million
in 1980 to about 5.5 million in 1990. Recently, total enrollment in the first
and second levels dropped. At the third level total enrollment, according to
UNESCO, reached a peak in 1987 and has declined since (Table 7 ). The
recent decline in the number of students in higher education is a reverse of
the rising trend of the 1960s and 1970s. Given the current economic and
employment situations this downward trend in higher education is likely to
continue in the future.
Recently, the government adopted a policy of expanding technical ed-
ucation to train the human resources needed in different economic sectors,
such as textile, electronics, petrochemicals, mechanics, animal husbandry,
and banking. The overall strategy is to expand technical education, im-
prove its quality, and establish new specializations. Due to high unemploy-
ment rates among university graduates, students have increasingly become
interested in vocations that guarantee employment. Therefore, technical
secondary schools, particularly three-year industrial schools, have attracted
many young adults. Technical secondary schools absorb about 62 percent
of the graduates from preparatory schools, compared with 32 percent from
general secondary schools (Soliman, 1994). The number of students in tech-
nical secondary schools increased from less than 1 million in 1988–1989 to
about 1.4 million in 1992–1993.
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Table 9. Percentage illiterate by sex (ages 10+) in Egypt.
Census year Males Females Total
1937 76.0 94.0 85.0
1947 65.0 84.0 75.0
1960 56.0 83.0 71.0
1966 52.0 79.0 65.0
1976 42.6 72.5 57.2
1986 37.8 61.8 49.4
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (1993).
These expansions in education have brought about considerable changes
in the sex composition of the student population. The gender gap in edu-
cation has narrowed across all levels of education in Egypt. The percent-
age of females in primary schools (first level according to UNESCO) and
preparatory and secondary schools (second level according to UNESCO) has
increased (Table 7 ). Consequently, the sex ratios have declined. For ex-
ample, the UNESCO statistics show a decline in the sex ratio from 1.49 in
1980 to 1.22 in 1991 at the first level, and from 1.71 in 1980 to 1.24 in 1991
at the second level. These changes in the sex composition of the student
population are also true for the third level.
Another important aspect of education in Egypt is that it is region-
ally unbalanced, and the regional disparities are quite large. For example, in
1990–1991 the governorate of Demiattia had a gross primary enrollment rate
of 118.3 percent compared with 75.9 percent in Beni Suef. However, it is
not known how regional disparities are distorted by differences in grade rep-
etition rates, which is widespread in Egypt. For example, in 1991–1992 the
percentage of students repeating grade 5 in primary schools was 15 percent
for males and 12.2 percent for females. Grade repetition rates in 1991–1992
were very high in the final grades of preparatory (20.2 percent for males and
15.3 percent for females) and secondary schools (22.3 percent for males and
20.1 percent for females). As a result of these high repetition rates the age
of the student population at each level of education is likely to span beyond
standard age limits.
In spite of the rapid expansion in education, illiteracy in Egypt is still
high but declining moderately. Censuses taken between 1937 and 1986 give
declining illiteracy rates (Table 9 ). These rates are higher for females than
for males, and higher in rural areas than in urban areas. National sample
surveys also show higher illiteracy for women than for men. For example,
the 1992 DHS for Egypt shows that only 22.5 percent of males from ages 5 to
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Table 10. Percentage of individuals with no schooling and median years of
education by sex and residence in Egypt.
% no schooling Median years of education
Place of residence Females Males Gap Males Females Gap
Urban governorates 23.9 13.6 10.3 6.9 5.7 1.2
Lower Egypt 40.2 22.9 17.3 5.2 2.2 3.0
Urban 26.3 14.7 11.6 6.6 4.6 2.0
Rural 46.0 26.5 19.5 4.5 1.0 3.5
Upper Egypt 52.7 28.6 24.1 4.2 0.0 4.2
Urban 30.0 18.5 11.5 6.4 4.2 2.0
Rural 63.3 33.2 30.1 3.2 0.0 3.2
Total urban 26.0 15.0 11.0 6.7 5.0 1.7
Total rural 53.7 29.4 24.3 4.0 0.0 4.0
Total Egypt 40.7 22.5 18.2 5.3 2.3 3.0
Source: El-Zanaty et al. (1993: Tables 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).
65 and over in the sample have no schooling, compared with 40.7 percent of
females (El-Zanaty et al., 1993). Another important finding is that women’s
education lasts for a shorter period than men’s. On average, the median
years of schooling is 2.3 for women and 5.3 for men. Gender differences in
education are larger than differences between urban and rural areas (Ta-
ble 10 ). Women in rural upper Egypt are at the bottom of the educational
system.
One important factor that helps to explain the inconsistency between
rapid education expansion and high illiteracy rates in Egypt is high popula-
tion growth. The population in Egypt grew from 26.1 million in 1960 to 36.6
million in 1976 and to 48.2 million in 1986. The school-age population (5–
24-year olds) increased from 10.9 million in 1960 to 16.7 million in 1976 and
to 21.2 million in 1986. This rapid growth increases demands on educational
services, but on the supply side, expenditure on education is limited because
of scarce financial resources. Total educational expenditure as a percentage
of GNP was 4.1 percent in 1960, 5.7 percent in 1981, and 3.8 percent in
1990 (UNESCO, 1994). Actual funds allocated by the government to meet
education needs are usually far below the amounts required. In addition, ed-
ucation accounts for about 2 percent of total household expenditure in Cairo
and less than 1 percent in the rural areas in upper and lower Egypt (Soliman,
1994). Financial difficulties, coupled with a policy of free education, have led
to inefficiencies in the educational system. There is a shortage of primary
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and secondary schools, and many of the existing ones are not adequate for
teaching and training. The government’s long-standing policy of guaranteed
employment for all university graduates has also created inefficiencies in the
labor market.
Libya
Formal education in Libya is organized at four levels of schooling: primary,
preparatory, secondary, and universities and institutions of higher education.
Primary and preparatory schools are compulsory for all children aged 6 to
14. At the primary level (first level as defined by UNESCO) children enter
the first grade when they are 6, and on successful completion of grade 6,
approximately at age 11, they proceed to grade 7, which is the first grade at
the preparatory level. Preparatory classes cover a three-year period to grade
9. The third level, secondary education, lasts for three years and corresponds
to ages 15, 16, and 17 (Libya’s preparatory and secondary education equals
second-level education of UNESCO). However, the 1984 census results show
that the age span is between ages 6 and 14 for primary school students,
12 and 19 for preparatory school students, 15 and 24 for secondary school
students, and 19 and 24 years for students at the university level (third level
according to UNESCO). These are the age and population groups for which
one would expect the fewest reporting errors.
Education in Libya expanded rapidly between 1973 and 1984. During
this period the size of the student population doubled. Girls in the student
population increased by 130 percent, compared with 80 percent for boys
(Table 11 ). The increases were dramatic at the preparatory (433 percent),
secondary (783 percent), and university (537 percent) levels. Most of these
increases were in the urban population (Table 12 ). The 1984 student popu-
lation in urban areas was 2.5 times larger than the 1973 student population;
in contrast, the student population in rural areas increased only 1.2 times
over this period. Consequently, the urban/rural student population ratio
changed from 1.6 in 1973 to 3.3 in 1984. These results are not surprising be-
cause the population became more urban, due to both high natural increase
in urban areas and rural/urban migration. Approximately 75 percent of the
population lived in urban areas in 1984, in contrast to about 58 percent in
1973. Moreover, only 0.1 percent of all families in Libya were nomadic or
semi-nomadic in 1984 versus 3.8 percent in 1973. The rapid rate of urban
population growth, the high income generated primarily from the oil boom
38
Table 11. Student population and enrollment rates by level of education
and sex in Libya.
Student population Gross enrollment rates, 1984
Sex 1973 1984 % change Urban Rural All
Primary 434,606 674,180 55.1 1.06 1.03 1.05
Males 250,259 352,021 40.7 1.08 1.08 1.08
Females 184,347 322,159 74.8 1.03 0.97 1.02
Preparatory 80,073 251,831 214.5 0.94 0.82 0.91
Males 60,297 146,420 142.8 1.04 1.01 1.03
Females 19,776 105,411 433.0 0.83 0.62 0.77
Secondary 26,500 139,658 427.0 0.61 0.52 0.59
Males 20,674 88,236 326.8 0.74 0.71 0.73
Females 5,826 51,422 782.6 0.49 0.32 0.45
University 9,802 30,828 214.5 0.10 0.05 0.09
Males 8,669 23,613 172.4 0.15 0.09 0.13
Females 1,133 7,215 536.8 0.05 0.01 0.04
All levels 550,981 1,096,497 99.0 0.71 0.66 0.70
Males 339,899 610,290 79.6 0.77 0.75 0.76
Females 211,082 486,207 130.3 0.65 0.57 0.63
Source: Department of Statistics and Census, Libya (1984).
during the 1970s, and the small population base are among the factors that
have contributed significantly to the expansion of education in Libya.
Absolute numbers of the student population are of limited use unless
they can be related to the school-age population. Enrollment rate – that is,
the rate of the student population to total population between ages 6 and 24
– is a useful measure. The overall enrollment rate in Libya increased by 5.8
percentage points – from 64.1 percent in 1973 to 69.9 percent in 1984. During
the same period the enrollment rate increased by 7.8 percentage points (from
58.1 percent to 65.9 percent) in rural areas and 2.8 points (from 68.4 percent
to 71.2 percent) in urban areas. Probably due to increasing urbanization,
expanding education in urban areas, and rural/urban migration, more class
space became available in the rural areas, particularly for females left behind
in villages. Interestingly, enrollment rates for males in urban and rural
areas did not change significantly between 1973 and 1984. By contrast, the
enrollment rate increased by 17.7 percentage points for rural women and 5.7
percentage points for urban women during the same period. Thus, women
in Libya have achieved substantial gains in education.
The oil-driven economy has empowered Libya to achieve universal pri-
mary education in a very short period. The 1984 gross enrollment rate at the
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Table 12. Student population and total population between ages 6 and 24
and enrollment rates by residence and sex in Libya.
1973 1984
Sex Students Total Rate Students Total Rate
Urban 340,113 497,458 0.684 838,296 1,177,083 0.712
Males 195,420 254,913 0.767 459,978 598,328 0.769
Females 144,693 242,545 0.597 378,318 578,755 0.654
Rural 207,425 356,756 0.581 258,201 391,888 0.659
Males 141,361 186,796 0.757 150,312 201,105 0.747
Females 66,064 169,960 0.389 107,889 190,783 0.566
All areas 547,538 854,214 0.641 1,096,497 1,568,971 0.699
Males 336,781 441,709 0.762 610,290 799,433 0.763
Females 210,757 412,505 0.511 486,207 769,538 0.632
Source: Department of Statistics and Census, Libya (1984).
primary level – that is, the rate of students in primary schools to children in
the total population between ages 6 and 11 – exceeded 1 for boys in urban
and rural areas. Girls have achieved a gross enrollment rate of 1.03 in urban
areas and 0.97 in rural areas. The comprehensiveness of primary education
can further be supported by examining age-specific enrollment rates. These
rates are high, 90 percent or more for girls and boys from age 7 to 11 in
urban and rural areas (Table 13 ). The age pattern of primary enrollment
rates shows a high plateau between ages 7 and 11. At age 6 the ratio is
low primarily because not all children enter school at age 6. Because of this
factor and because of grade repetition, some students reach age 14 while
they are in primary schools.
At the preparatory and secondary levels the number of female students
increased by 5 and 8.8 times their 1973 size; the increase for males was only
2.4 and 4.3, respectively. However, the gross enrollment rate for females
is far below that for males, particularly in rural areas. These differences
are clearly reflected in the age-specific ratios for preparatory and secondary
education. At the university level the enrollment rates are lower for females
than for males and are the lowest for females in rural areas. Social factors
such as early marriage may have discouraged some girls from continuing
their education.
Several important outcomes have resulted from the rapid expansion of
education in Libya. Illiteracy has declined substantially, and the gender gap
has narrowed significantly. The illiteracy rate among people age 10 or older
has declined by about 18.5 percentage points: from 50.9 percent in 1973 to
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Table 13. Age-specific enrollment rates by sex and place of residence in
Libya and Sudan.
Urban Rural
Age Males Females Difference Males Females Difference
Libya 1984
6 0.4652 0.4459 0.0193 0.4591 0.4199 0.0392
7–9 0.9663 0.9459 0.0204 0.9503 0.8829 0.0674
10–12 0.9819 0.9378 0.0441 0.9720 0.8632 0.1088
13–15 0.9682 0.7959 0.1723 0.9531 0.6595 0.2936
16–18 0.8059 0.5336 0.2723 0.7870 0.3634 0.4236
19–21 0.4275 0.2415 0.1860 0.3886 0.1383 0.2503
22–24 0.1904 0.0668 0.1236 0.1422 0.0324 0.1098
Sudan 1983
7–9 0.5717 0.5594 0.0123 0.2879 0.2304 0.0575
10–12 0.8118 0.7666 0.0452 0.4249 0.3254 0.0995
13–15 0.7082 0.6727 0.0355 0.3470 0.2492 0.0978
16–18 0.5073 0.4768 0.0305 0.2075 0.1093 0.0982
19–21 0.3000 0.2405 0.0595 0.1195 0.0325 0.0870
22–24 0.1360 0.1102 0.0258 0.0589 0.0159 0.0430
Source: Department of Statistics and Census, Libya (1984); Department of Statistics,
Sudan (1989).
32.4 percent in 1984. Women’s education increased impressively during the
1973–1984 period. Illiteracy among females age 10 or older declined from
72.7 percent in 1973 to 47.1 percent in 1984; for males the decline was from
30.9 percent to 18.4 percent. This drop of about 26 percentage points in
less than 15 years is a remarkable achievement in women’s education. Con-
sequently, the gender gap in education in Libya has narrowed substantially.
This gap, when measured in percentage point differences between enrollment
rates for boys and girls, declined from 36.8 in 1973 to 18.1 in 1984 in rural
areas, and from 17 in 1973 to 11.5 in 1984 in urban areas.
Although the gender gap has decreased, still fewer girls than boys con-
tinue to climb the upper rungs of the education ladder. Nevertheless, Libya
has accomplished a great deal by putting the majority of its young gener-
ations in schools. The educational success in Libya is likely to continue as
young generations move up the age pyramid. However, the real challenge
is to maintain this achievement by reducing school dropout rates and en-
couraging students, particularly females, to continue their education at the
higher levels.
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Morocco
Before independence, education in Morocco was organized under the Direc-
tion of Public Instructions. A National Ministry of Education was estab-
lished in 1955, and in 1959 the structure of education in Morocco was laid
down in five divisions: preschool, primary, secondary, professional forma-
tion, and higher education. Primary education is compulsory for all children
between ages 7 and 13 (Direction of Statistics, 1990). Until 1990 it was
provided in five-year schools; in 1990 this was changed to six-year schools.
Progress in primary education was undeniably made between 1960 and 1990.
Primary school enrollment more than doubled, and the rate of enrollment
for 7-year-old children grew from 13 percent in 1960 to 67 percent in 1990.
The percentage of girls in the total student population at this level increased
slightly from 37.01 percent in 1980 to 40.54 percent in 1992. Consequently,
the sex ratio of students in primary schools declined from 1.70 to 1.47 over
the period (Table 7 ).
National sample surveys show substantial sex differences in enrollment
rates in primary schools. For example, the DHS for Morocco shows enroll-
ment rates in primary education (ages 5–9) of 71.4 for boys and 54.8 for girls
(Azelmat et al., 1992). The enrollment rates for the 10–14 age group are
61.4 for boys and 44.0 for girls. These sex differences are due to the fact that
very few educational opportunities are available to girls in rural areas. The
DHS shows that only 14.3 percent of the females in rural areas have received
a primary education in contrast to 31.3 percent of the urban females; the
percentages for males are 32 and 38.8, respectively.
Students who successfully complete their primary education proceed to
the secondary and professional formation levels. Secondary education lasts
seven years and is divided into two cycles: the first cycle is four years; the
second cycle is three years. The second cycle is condensed and students
graduate with degrees in literature, science, or technology. At the secondary
level, students may take instructions in Arabic, French, or both.
The student population in secondary schools grew slowly from about 1.2
million in 1985–1986 to 1.4 million in 1989–1990. Girls make up between 39
percent and 40 percent of the total student population in secondary schools.
The sex ratio of secondary school students declined slightly from 1.52 in
1985–1986 to 1.47 in 1989–1990.
Professional formation, which was introduced in Morocco in 1984, is
equivalent to a general technical education in many other countries in the
Arab world. Its main objective is to provide students with economic and
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social development skills and to promote employment. Professional educa-
tion consists of three cycles. The first cycle is technical and is accessible to
students who successfully complete seven years in secondary schools. Grad-
uates from this cycle obtain a technical diploma. The second cycle is called
“qualification” and is accessible to students who complete grade 4, 5, or 6
of secondary education. Graduates from this cycle obtain a certificate of
professional qualification. The third cycle is called “specialization” and is
accessible to students with certificates from primary education and those
who complete grade 3 of secondary education. Students in this cycle ac-
quire essential trade, construction, or agricultural skills. Students in profes-
sional formation make up only 2 percent of all students in general education.
However, female students have increased from about 19,000 to 27,000. Con-
sequently the sex ratio of students in the professional formation level has
declined from about 2.6 to about 1.5.
Morocco has 11 universities and a large number of specialized institu-
tions of higher education. Total enrollment in higher education is 4 percent
to 5 percent of the total student population in Morocco. The sex ratio of
students in higher education declined from about 2.07 in 1985–1986 to 1.75
in 1989–1990.
Morocco has made substantial progress in education since its indepen-
dence. The share of the state budget allocated to education increased from
17 percent in 1961 to 23 percent in 1988. The number of students enrolled
in various educational levels has more than doubled. The number of women
in technical schools and higher education has increased, which is a sign of
the social change and progress in women’s educational opportunities in Mo-
rocco. However, the rate of enrollment among females is lower than the
national average, especially in rural areas. Illiteracy is widespread; accord-
ing to the 1982 census, 69.7 percent of the population age 15 or older is
illiterate (56.3 percent for males and 82.5 percent for females). Illiteracy
rates are higher in rural areas (74.5 percent for males and 97.2 percent for
females) than in urban areas (34.9 percent for males and 64.8 percent for
females). School dropout rates are considerably high and vary tremendously
from one province to another (ranging from 24 percent to 98.7 percent).
Sudan
Sudan has made reasonable progress in the field of education. When it
gained independence in 1956 the total population of Sudan was 10.3 million,
of which about 2 percent were students. The large majority (86 percent) of
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the population age 5 or older was illiterate. Immediately after independence
a policy was introduced to nationalize jobs and to train personnel for the
rapidly expanding public and private sectors. Seventeen years later, in 1973,
the population of Sudan reached 14.1 million and the number of students
increased to 1.2 million (8.5 percent). In 1983 the population at 20.5 million
was double its 1956 size, and the number of students was about 2.1 million
(10.2 percent). Despite these substantial achievements, most of the popu-
lation remained illiterate. The illiteracy rate for the population age 10 or
older was 68.7 percent in 1973 and 64.0 percent in 1983. There is still much
to be done to improve the overall education level in Sudan.
Formal education in Sudan was introduced by the British during the
1920s. Since then several structural reforms have been introduced. The
four-year curriculum for the primary, intermediate, and secondary schools
inherited from the colonial era was changed in 1970 to a six-year curriculum
for primary schools and a three-year curriculum for intermediate and sec-
ondary levels. Further reform was introduced in 1991 when the primary and
intermediate levels of education were amalgamated into one eight-year level
called “basic education.” Several other changes were also introduced. Arabic
replaced English as the medium of instruction in secondary schools in 1970
and in universities and institutions of higher education in 1991. The 1991
reform shortened the duration of general education (from 12 to 11 years) and
broadened its base at the primary level. Also, the number of universities and
higher education institutes has quadrupled since 1990.
These reforms were brought about by politically unstable governments
in Sudan. One drawback of the 1991 reforms is that education has expanded
quantitatively at the expense of quality. The overall standard of education
at the university level has deteriorated because of lack of staff and Arabic
textbooks. Education has become a burden on parents. With increasing
poverty and low household income more children are likely to end up working
on the streets instead of attending schools. This situation has a negative
impact on the overall educational attainment of the population. Each level
of education in the system serves as a preparatory stage for the next level.
Therefore, students hope to move up through the system. However, because
of filter examinations and limited class spaces, few students move up to
the top level. Only gifted students, those who have achieved high scores
on final exams, proceed to secondary schools and universities. This rigid
system has led to a large number of girls and boys who proceed to adulthood
without secondary and tertiary education. Class space is also limited at the
primary level. Therefore, a large number of children end up with no formal
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education. Unmet educational needs will undoubtedly slow the progress
toward achieving widespread primary education. Several other factors deter
the attainment of universal primary education in Sudan. The country is
vast and sparsely populated, and has limited financial resources. These
constraints are likely to affect future education expansions.
Sudan’s enrollment rate of 46.2 percent in primary schools is substan-
tially below the average in other countries of North Africa. Regional dis-
parities are substantial in the primary (first level according to UNESCO),
intermediate, and secondary (second level according to UNESCO) schools
(Table 14 ). Southern Sudan is far behind the other regions in the country.
Intake in primary education in the southern region is about one-third of the
northern region, and half the average for Sudan. Less than half of the 7-year-
old population in Kordofan, Darfur, and the eastern regions enters primary
schools. Also, because of space limitations and other factors, dropout rates
from primary schools are high in these regions. Total enrollment is, therefore,
very low in primary schools, and subsequently in intermediate and secondary
schools.
Regional disparities by gender are also pronounced. The regions with
low educational levels have the highest gender difference. Intake in primary
schools for females is about half that for males in Kordofan, Darfur, and the
southern regions, and about 7.3 to 12.1 percentage points lower than that for
males in Khartoum, central, and eastern regions. These gender differences
are reflected somewhat at the primary, intermediate, and secondary levels.
Only in the northern region do females have intake and enrollment rates
comparable to males. Another observation derived from Table 14 is that in
all regions, except Khartoum, enrollment rates for females are lower than the
rates for males at all levels of education; this is probably due to the higher
dropout rates among females than among males. In Khartoum, females
in intermediate and secondary schools have higher enrollment rates than
males. There are considerable gender differences at the tertiary level. For
example, females attending the two largest universities of Khartoum and the
Khartoum Branch of the Cairo University comprise 26.6 percent and 39.4
percent, respectively, of the total student population.
Enrollment rates by age calculated from the 1983 census results show
that there are considerable gender differences (Table 8 ). At each age group
males have higher enrollment rates than females, particularly for the 16–18
and 19–21 age groups. When we control for place of residence (rural/urban)
the gender differences in education become more significant in rural areas
than in urban areas (Table 13 ). Because of more access to educational
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Table 14. Intake and enrollment rates by region and sex in Sudan in 1982–1983.a
Level of education Northern Khartoum Central Eastern Kordofan Darfur Southern Sudan
Intake in primary 86.3 69.0 68.7 44.4 39.6 35.2 29.7 55.8
Males 88.8 73.9 73.7 47.8 50.5 47.0 38.2 48.3
Females 84.2 61.8 63.6 40.5 27.9 22.8 20.6 40.4
Primary 84.4 80.7 68.8 39.6 39.3 32.6 18.8 46.2
Males 84.6 85.4 73.8 42.2 49.2 42.5 25.2 52.3
Females 84.2 76.3 63.4 36.5 28.1 21.6 11.9 39.5
Intermediate 57.6 65.5 35.1 21.2 19.1 15.4 8.3 26.3
Males 61.4 62.2 40.0 23.1 23.1 19.6 12.1 29.6
Females 53.7 69.4 30.0 16.8 15.0 10.8 4.2 22.9
Secondary 32.7 34.5 19.0 12.3 10.0 6.4 4.0 13.9
Males 39.8 33.9 24.4 14.4 14.4 9.9 6.1 17.1
Females 26.3 35.3 13.7 9.9 6.3 3.1 1.8 10.6
aIntake in primary as a percentage of the population at age 7. Enrollment rates refer to those enrolled in primary, intermediate,
and secondary schools as a percentage of those aged 7–12, 13–15, and 16–18, respectively.
Source: Department of Statistics, Sudan (1985).
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services, urban females are better educated than rural males. Rural males
and females, therefore, should be targeted for educational and development
services. If comprehensive primary education is to be achieved in Sudan
much must be done to reduce regional (rural/urban) and gender disparities.
There is need for many more schools in the relatively disadvantaged regions
and in the rural areas of Sudan. Unless political stability is achieved in
the country, it is hard to conceive of any progress in education in these
regions. Furthermore, cultural barriers to women’s education, particularly in
rural areas, have to be ameliorated somewhat through programs specifically
designed to address this issue. For example, the government could introduce
multi-objective schools and community centers for women and encourage
girls to work as teachers in their communities.
Tunisia
After independence, Tunisia seriously considered the importance of demo-
graphic parameters in the process of development. In addition to introducing
measures concerning health, employment, social security, regional develop-
ment, and family planning, the government completely reformed the educa-
tional system. The “schooling plan” (Plan de Scolarisation) was adopted
in 1958. The immediate consequence was the massive enrollment of girls in
schools, the effects of which were evident in many ways, but mostly in the
success of the family-planning program.
The system of education in Tunisia is based on three levels of schooling:
primary, secondary, and higher education. Primary education (first level
as defined by UNESCO) starts at age 6 and continues for six years. A few
primary schools extend to eight years. After successful completion of primary
education the great majority of students proceeds to secondary education
(second level for UNESCO) which consists of three- and four-year stages.
Those who pass the final secondary exams compete for places in the institutes
of higher education (UNESCO’s third level).
Education in Tunisia is compulsory for the first 11 years for all persons
between ages 6 and 16. Total enrollment in primary education in Tunisia
increased from about 1.1 million in 1980 to 1.4 million in 1992 (Institute of
National Statistics, 1990).
The educational system underwent some drastic austerity measures after
the implementation of the adjustment program in 1986 – between 1985 and
1987, the number of children enrolled in secondary school decreased by 8
percent and stagnated in the other school levels (Table 7 ). However, the
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late 1980s witnessed some major improvements in school enrollment levels
for both sexes. The proportion of children aged 6 to 11 enrolled in primary
schools was 100 percent for boys and 92 percent for girls in 1990. Enrollment
in secondary schools increased considerably in the late 1980s. Whereas 45
percent of the children aged 12 to 17 were enrolled in school in 1980, 63
percent were enrolled in 1990. The gender gap at this level is still substantial;
there is a difference of more than 15 percentage points between male and
female adolescents attending school. Of the young people in the 18–23 age
group, only 18 percent remained in school. The number of women receiving
tertiary education doubled in the 1980s.
These improvements are not yet reflected in the educational status of
the whole population. According to the DHS, 57 percent of the women have
never received any form of education, 31 percent have had some primary ed-
ucation, and 12 percent have reached the secondary or tertiary levels (Aloui
et al. 1988). The proportion of women with some schooling (primary, sec-
ondary, tertiary or higher) doubled between 1978 and 1988. The level of
schooling is also reflected in the literacy rates of women: 61 percent of
women were classified as illiterate, whereas 39 percent were able to read a
newspaper or to write a letter.
There are significant differences in educational levels depending on re-
gion, place of residence, and age category. The younger the woman, the more
likely she has received an education (the proportion of women between ages
15 and 19 without any schooling is 35.4). The proportion of women with no
schooling is 80 percent in rural areas, nearly double the proportion of women
in urban areas (40.5 percent). The northwest and the central west have the
highest proportion of women without any schooling. Of the women living
in urban areas 89.5 percent have attended school, but only 20.1 percent of
rural women have attended school. Women attaining the higher levels of
education (secondary level or higher) are concentrated in urban areas where
they represent 95.1 percent of all women with secondary or higher education.
5. Scenario Assumptions for the Next 50 Years
Multistate population projections by education require assumptions not only
on the future course of fertility and mortality, but also on the future transi-
tions between educational states. The question is, How would fertility and
mortality evolve in the future given current and future changes in educa-
tional attainment? It is well documented that education is one of the most
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powerful factors that affect demographic behavior (fertility, mortality, and
migration). The literature is replete with studies on the retrospective in-
teractions of education with fertility, mortality, and migration, and almost
devoid of prospective views on these interactions. As well, numerous calcu-
lations have been done on future school enrollment rates but not on their
impacts on the resulting population. In fact, forecasts of future interactions
of education with demographic behavior are rare. The importance of con-
sidering these forecasts stems from education momentum, which is linked
to a population’s growth momentum. This latter component is well known
in demographic analyses, but rarely linked to non-demographic factors such
as education. The inclusion of education in demographic analyses adds two
closely linked elements. The first requires that consideration be given to the
young age structure, resulting primarily from past high fertility and declin-
ing mortality levels, that pushes the momentum of population growth in the
countries of North Africa. The second element takes into account the fact
that through the years students move up the education scale. Therefore, the
educational attainment of the population changes as younger and more edu-
cated cohorts move up the age and education scales. A stagnation in school
enrollment, caused by financial, socioeconomic, or political problems, may
still be associated with increasing average education. Also, the future im-
pacts of past high levels of illiteracy are as inescapable as the future impacts
of past high fertility and mortality levels. The current illiterate generations
did not attend schools in the past and the future illiterate generations would
be those that are not able to attend schools today. Even if school enroll-
ment is high, it is very difficult to educate the uneducated adult population
groups.
Future uncertainties are substantial in each of the six countries of North
Africa. Each country provides its own laboratory for demographic and so-
cial behavior. The development of women’s status, fertility, mortality, and
education has been very diverse in these countries. The levels of these fac-
tors and the rate by which they have changed vary from country to country.
Moreover, the political and economic situations differ from one country to
the next. Also, the governments in these countries have different social poli-
cies and programs, particularly in the fields of education and health – two
crucial components that shape future demographic patterns.
Given these issues, we established our assumptions on substantive knowl-
edge on fertility, mortality, and education, as described in the previous sec-
tions of this report. We also used age- and sex-specific population data
available from the last census of each country as a basis for the projection.
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Table 15. The International Standard Classification of Education used by
UNESCO.
State Definition
1 No schooling Those who have never attended school or have completed
less than one year of primary school education.
2 Primary education Those who have completed the final grade at the first level
of education or have completed at least one year of
primary education.
3 Secondary education Those who have completed the final grade at the second
level of education or have entered secondary schools but
have not completed the final grade.
4 Tertiary education Those who have undertaken third-level studies (ISCED 5,
6, or 7) regardless of whether they have completed the
course.
Consequently, the base year is not the same in all the countries: Morocco,
1982; Sudan, 1983; Tunisia, 1984; Libya, 1984; Egypt, 1986; and Algeria,
1987. The end year of the projection depends on the base year, so it also
varies from country to country. It is important to note that these censuses
were taken within a five-year period (1982–1987) and the projections are to
the 2032–2037 period. When available, more recent data on fertility and
mortality were incorporated into the projections, for instance, in the case of
mortality and fertility rates for Egypt (1991), Sudan (1988), Tunisia (1989),
and Morocco (1992). These new data improved the base for the projections.
We divided the base year population in each country into four states: no
schooling, primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education.
The definition of these four states is based on the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) used by UNESCO (Table 15 ).
5.1 Base year parameters
The base year parameters for education are transition rates: from no school-
ing to primary, from primary to secondary, and from secondary to tertiary.
The calculation of these transition rates is rather problematic because the
five-year age intervals usually used for grouping demographic data do not
correspond exactly to schooling intervals. Due to early entry, grade repeti-
tion, and school dropout, the duration of each level of education is substan-
tially shorter than the age span of students. Schooling intervals vary from
country to country and are not in five-year periods. To eliminate some of
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these difficulties we based the transition rates on the hierarchical nature of
the educational systems. The transition rates from no schooling to primary
education are higher than those from primary schools to secondary schools
which are, in turn, higher than those from secondary schools to the tertiary
level. Another aspect of the base year transition rates is that they are higher
for males than for females (Tables 16–21 ) because the data show substantial
gender gaps in education.
In the base year the overall total fertility rate for each country is lower
than the rate for women with no schooling (Tables 16–21 ) and the fertility
rates are lower at higher educational levels. We assumed that this pattern
would continue throughout the projection period for each country. This pat-
tern of fertility by education has been well established by data from censuses
and national sample surveys of countries in North Africa. To account for
the high sensitivity of fertility to slight increases in women’s education in
these countries, we assumed a one-child difference between women with no
education and women with a primary education, and a smaller difference
between the remaining educational groups.
Unfortunately we must assume the same mortality level for the four
states primarily because accurate mortality data by level of education are
not available. This assumption is rather unrealistic because higher education
often results in better health and personal hygiene and higher income. But
the assumption of any specific percentage difference of mortality in differ-
ent educational groups would have been completely arbitrary and therefore
impossible to justify.
No international migration has been assumed in these scenarios. This
is partly because of the lack of reliable data, but also because significant
international migration would obscure the analysis of educational change
and the impact of alternative fertility and mortality patterns. International
migration is discussed separately in Section 7.
5.2 Scenario assumptions
We defined three scenarios for each state in each of the six countries in
North Africa. Each scenario combines low, central, and high assumptions
on fertility, mortality, and education. The base year parameters of each
country remain the same in all three scenarios. The assumptions for the
scenarios were obtained by following three simple rules. These rules were
used to determine the directions of change:
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Table 16. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Algeria in
2037.
Base year
1987 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 5.2 2.1 3.5 4.8
No schooling 5.7 2.9 4.8 5.7
Primary education 4.7 2.2 3.9 4.7
Secondary education 4.2 2.0 2.6 4.2
Tertiary education 3.3 1.6 1.9 3.3
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 68.3 83.5 75.7 65.8
Female 68.7 84.0 76.1 66.2
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 93.0 100.0 (2007– 100.0a 93.0
Female 79.0 100.0 2012) 100.0a 79.0
From primary to secondary
Male 61.0 80.0 66.0a 55.0
Female 46.0 80.0 65.0a 38.3
From secondary to tertiary
Male 18.0 30.0 21.0a 18.0
Female 10.0 30.0 17.0a 10.0
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2012.
1. Primary education increases before secondary, and secondary education
increases before tertiary. This rule is necessarily true because of the hi-
erarchical nature of education: a person must complete primary school
before attending secondary school, and secondary school before being
admitted to the tertiary level. The percentage of an age group with pri-
mary education is greater than the age group with secondary education
which, in turn, is greater than the age group with tertiary education be-
cause the latter groups are subpopulations of the former groups. Since
this is true for each age group, it is also true for the adult population
as a whole. At any point in time, the proportion of adults with at least
primary education is larger than or equal to the proportion with at least
secondary education, and the proportion of adults with at least sec-
ondary education is larger than or equal to the proportion with tertiary
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Table 17. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Egypt in
2036.
Base year
1986 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 5.6 1.8 2.6 3.4
No schooling 6.1 2.4 3.6 4.2
Primary education 5.1 2.0 3.1 3.6
Secondary education 4.5 1.7 2.2 2.9
Tertiary education 3.6 1.5 1.7 2.0
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 59.7 76.1 70.9 65.6
Female 61.9 78.5 73.3 68.0
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 95.9 100.0 (1991– 100.0 (1991– 89.6
Female 86.3 100.0 1996) 100.0 1996) 63.0
From primary to secondary
Male 64.0 90.0 73.5a 52.3
Female 45.6 90.0 64.3a 32.4
From secondary to tertiary
Male 28.2 50.0 29.8a 28.2
Female 16.0 50.0 21.7a 16.0
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2011.
education. Moreover, because it takes a number of years to complete
each level, the increase in the secondary lags behind that in the primary
level, and the increase in the tertiary level lags behind that in the sec-
ondary level. The time lag is equal to the number of years it takes to
pass from one level of education to the next.
2. In any given educational level, boys tend to precede girls. This rule
is based on the data that show that at low levels of general education
girls lag far behind boys and on observations from historical data on
each educational level. The data also indicate that at high or university
levels of education, the educational gender gap disappears.
3. Fertility is lower among women with higher education. Moreover, when
the general level of education of women is very low, the differential of
fertility by level of education is small. In a period when educational
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Table 18. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Libya in
2034.
Base year
1984 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 6.8 2.3 3.6 4.9
No schooling 7.3 3.3 5.2 6.5
Primary education 6.3 2.8 4.3 5.6
Secondary education 5.6 2.2 3.5 4.5
Tertiary education 4.5 1.6 2.3 3.4
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 56.7 73.5 66.2 59.0
Female 60.1 76.9 69.6 62.4
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 100.0 100.0 100.0a 86.3
Female 100.0 100.0 100.0a 75.0
From primary to secondary
Male 89.5 93.0 79.3a 78.3
Female 72.0 93.0 76.0a 58.3
From secondary to tertiary
Male 30.6 45.0 30.5a 32.5
Female 23.0 45.0 45.0a 27.5
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2014.
levels are increasing, women with higher education tend to take the lead
in reducing their fertility, and a fertility gap appears. The extent of
the gap depends on factors such as the country’s level of development
and family-planning programs (Freedman, 1987). At levels of very high
average education and very low fertility, the fertility gap diminishes or
disappears. Thus, fertility differentials by level of education are great-
est during the middle phase of a secular fertility decline. There is a
long time lag between beginning efforts to educate the youth and the
effects of having an educated adult population; this long time lag is
easy to explain. In Europe, the transformation from an illiterate to
a literate society during the industrialization process usually took at
least 50 years, and sometimes more than 75 years. Research on educa-
tion diffusion developed by Goujon and Wils (forthcoming) shows that
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Table 19. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Morocco in
2032.
Base year
1982 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 6.0 1.7 2.6 3.7
No schooling 6.4 1.9 2.8 3.9
Primary education 5.3 1.7 2.4 3.4
Secondary education 4.7 1.5 2.2 2.9
Tertiary education 3.7 1.3 1.7 2.0
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 54.6 73.1 64.9 56.6
Female 58.6 77.1 68.9 60.6
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 74.0 90.0 69.8a 60.0
Female 47.0 90.0 58.5a 40.0
From primary to secondary
Male 28.0 70.0 52.8a 45.0
Female 18.0 70.0 42.3a 30.0
From secondary to tertiary
Male 5.0 40.0 24.6a 20.0
Female 4.0 40.0 18.5a 10.0
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2012.
the time lag is considerably longer than a generation, and closer to the
length of an adult lifetime (i.e., 40–50 years rather than 15–20). Their
work also shows that, because in most developing countries the present
young generations are very large in relation to the adult population, the
change from an “uneducated adult population” to an “educated adult
population” is nonlinear and can happen quite suddenly, when the large
young cohorts become adults. The nonlinear increase of average edu-
cational levels also means that the associated fertility levels decrease in
a nonlinear fashion – in fact, fertility can drop at a faster rate than
expected once a large cohort of relatively well-educated young women
enters childbearing age. This could, in part, explain some of the sudden
fertility changes observed in some countries (Mauritius, Thailand, Asian
Tigers, Jamaica). Thus, it is possible that fertility will fall faster than
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Table 20. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Sudan in
2033.
Base year
1983 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 6.9 2.5 4.0 5.5
No schooling 7.1 2.8 4.1 5.7
Primary education 6.1 2.4 3.6 4.8
Secondary education 5.4 1.9 2.9 4.1
Tertiary education 4.3 1.6 2.3 3.2
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 44.5 64.2 56.4 46.9
Female 45.7 67.0 59.5 49.7
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 42.8 90.0 41.7 (1993– 40.3
Female 32.0 90.0 33.3 1998) 32.2
From primary to secondary
Male 29.8 50.0 30.0a 28.5
Female 20.8 50.0 25.5a 24.3
From secondary to tertiary
Male 11.0 30.0 13.5a 13.5
Female 5.0 30.0 8.0a 8.0
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2013.
expected in aggregate projections, and that populations will grow more
slowly than currently expected. The larger the education effort of the
past the larger the drop in fertility will be.
Scenario 1 (Low Scenario)
This scenario combines low fertility, low mortality, and high education. High
education means the highest transition rates we would expect each country
to achieve by the end of the projection period. Therefore, the transition
rates range between 90 and 100 from no schooling to primary, between 50
and 90 from primary to secondary, and between 30 and 50 from secondary to
tertiary education. We assume that all males and females of Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia receive a primary education at a specified future date.
56
Table 21. Base year parameters and scenario assumptions for Tunisia in
2034.
Base year
1984 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
TFR
Total population 4.5 1.8 2.2 3.1
No schooling 5.0 2.6 3.0 3.9
Primary education 4.0 2.1 2.5 3.1
Secondary education 3.6 1.6 2.0 2.4
Tertiary education 2.9 1.3 1.6 1.9
Life expectancy (in years)
Male 62.3 79.3 74.0 68.7
Female 63.4 80.8 75.5 70.2
Education transition (in %)
From no schooling to primary
Male 100.0 100.0 100.0a 93.4
Female 87.0 100.0 (1994– 100.0 (2009– 72.8
1999) 2014)
From primary to secondary
Male 59.8 90.0 73.3a 55.3
Female 40.2 90.0 71.2a 33.7
From secondary to tertiary
Male 17.0 50.0 22.5a 15.5
Female 10.0 50.0 21.5a 8.0
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUNESCO scenario up to 2014–2019.
These four countries have already achieved high levels of primary education;
therefore we expect these high levels to be maintained in the future. Because
widespread primary education would mean substantial efforts for Morocco
and Sudan, we decided to lower the target to 90 percent of children receiving
primary education. With increasing educational levels we assume that the
gender gap disappears in all six countries. Therefore the transition rates
for females are the same as the rates for males at all levels by the end of
the period. This is not unexpected, as some countries (Libya, Tunisia, and
Egypt) have already reached parity in primary enrollment.
Consistent with high education we assume that fertility and mortality
reach low levels by the end of the projection period. Low fertility means the
lowest level of total fertility rate that women at a particular educational level
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would achieve. At the national level TFR is assumed to reach a low level
of below 2 in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia and between 2.1 and 2.5 in the
remaining three countries. Women who attain secondary and tertiary levels
of education are assumed to achieve TFR of 2 or less, except for women
with secondary education in Libya who achieve a TFR of 2.2. The TFR
of women without schooling or primary education is assumed to be more
than or equal to the national average. Also, we assume that the fertility
differentials between educational levels are reduced; the difference of about
2 children between no schooling and tertiary education in the base year is
assumed to decline to between 0.9 and 1.7. These assumptions reflect a
smaller fertility difference between educational groups in the projection year
than in the base year, which is consistent with increasing women’s education.
Another aspect is that below replacement fertility is omnipresent. In view of
increasing urbanization and high sensitivity of fertility to women’s education
in North Africa, the assumption of replacement fertility is not unexpected,
particularly for women with secondary and higher levels of education.
The assumption of low mortality means an increase in life expectancy
at birth by from 1.6 to 2.2 years every five years for males and females. This
assumption foresees rapid health improvements, particularly in the countries
where mortality is currently high. In Sudan, for example, even though we
assume that males and females achieve the highest rate of change, their
life expectancy at birth remains below that of their counterparts in other
countries; this is primarily due to the initial high mortality levels in the
country.
Scenario 2 (Central Scenario)
In this scenario we assign central assumptions to fertility, mortality, and ed-
ucation. Central refers not to the arithmetic mean, but rather to the value
in the middle of the low and high extremes. Transition rates for the central
scenario are based on future enrollment rates as projected by UNESCO to
the year 2015 (UNESCO, 1993). Using annual enrollment data by level of
education, age group, and sex for the 1960–1993 period and the medium
variant of the 1992 Population Revision of the UN Population Division, the
Division of Statistics of UNESCO prepared enrollment trends and projec-
tions to the year 2025. We followed the UNESCO projections until 2015
and then kept them constant until the end of the period. For transition
rates from no schooling to primary education we assume that each country
achieves the UNESCO target results by the date indicated in Tables 16–21
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and then maintains these results until the end year of the projection (Tables
16–21 ). With the exception of Libya and Egypt, these dates are different
from those in scenario 1 to allow for a difference in the attainment of primary
education between the two scenario. The strategy is to keep these transition
rates lower than those in scenario 1, which assumes high education. The
transition rates from primary education to secondary education and from
secondary to tertiary are also based on the UNESCO scenario. We assume
that more females receive a secondary or tertiary education in this scenario
than in the base year, so as to narrow the observed gender gap. Unlike sce-
nario 1, this scenario allows for minor differences in the transition rates for
males and females.
At the national level we assume central fertility rates to be between 3.5
and 4 for Sudan, Algeria, and Libya, and between 2.2 and 2.6 for Tunisia,
Morocco, and Egypt. Comparing this assumption with the base year it
is evident that we project more rapid fertility decline in the latter group
of countries than the former group. In particular, we project a decline of
fertility in Morocco from 6.0 in 1982 to 2.6 in 2032; this latter fertility rate is
also projected for Tunisia and Egypt. We assume the total fertility rate for
women with tertiary education to be 2.3 in Libya and Sudan and to be less
than 2 in the remaining four countries. For women with secondary education
we assume that the TFR remains above 2 (2.2 to 3.5) in all countries except
Tunisia, for which we assume a TFR of 2. These assumptions indicate that
not all women with secondary and tertiary levels of education would achieve a
fertility level of 2 or less. With regard to women with no schooling and those
with primary education we assume that fertility declines to levels higher than
the national average in all countries except Sudan, where we assume that
the TFR declines to 4.1 and 3.6, respectively.
We assume that mortality for males and females declines by between
0.75 and 1.4 years every five years. Males and females achieve moderate
gains between 7.5 years and 13.5 years by the end of the projection period.
Under this assumption life expectancy at birth reaches between 56.4 and
75.7 for males and 59.5 and 76.1 for females.
Scenario 3 (High Scenario)
This scenario considers high assumptions for fertility and mortality and low
assumptions for education. We assume that the transition rates fall back to
the levels prevalent during the 1980s. For Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia we
assume that these transition rates are the same as or lower than the base
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year. For Libya, Morocco, and the Sudan we assume that the transition
rates from no schooling to secondary education are lower than the rates in
the base year. Also, for the same countries we assume that the rates from
primary to secondary education and from secondary to tertiary education
are higher than the corresponding rates in the base year. Together, these
assumptions make up the low-education scenario – the worst situation in our
forecasts.
With low-education assumptions, we assume that fertility is high, but
lower than the base year, at the national level. We apply this assumption to
all states and all countries except Algeria, where we assume fertility to be
equivalent to the base year level.
We assume that mortality declines slightly, by less than 0.75 years ev-
ery five years in all countries except Algeria, where we assume mortality
increases by 0.25 years every five years for males and females, resulting in
life expectancies at birth that are lower than those in the base year.
6. Analyses of Projection Results
Starting at the 1982–1987 period, the projection scenarios were carried
out over a 50-year period, until 2032–2037, for the six countries. Each
country was considered separately, in five-year steps, using the Population-
Development-Environment software program developed recently at IIASA.
This program has been used to produce population projections of the island
of Mauritius (Lutz, 1994c) and the Yucata´n Peninsula. The three scenar-
ios combine high, central, and low assumptions for fertility, mortality, and
education. Tables 22 and 23 show the base year values and results from
the three scenarios. These tables list the total population size by country,
the mean age of the population, percentages of the 0–14 age group and the
60+ age group (Table 22 ), and the percentages of males, females, and total
population by level of education (Table 23 ). (See Color Plates for selected
multistate age pyramids of projection results.)
6.1 Population size
Rapid population growth is certain in North Africa. The high, central, and
low scenarios show a total population of 374, 350, and 305 million persons,
respectively, by 2032–2037, compared with a total population of about 122
million persons in the base period. Under the low scenario, the four Maghreb
countries (Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco) grow from about 53 million
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Table 22. Scenario results under high, central, and low assumptions for
fertility, mortality, and education.
Base Population End Population (in 1,000) at end year
Country year (in 1,000) year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Algeria 1987 22,601 2037 63,376 74,128 83,385
Egypt 1986 48,056 2036 106,509 125,613 132,593
Libya 1984 3,231 2034 11,256 12,649 14,108
Morocco 1982 20,450 2032 55,934 61,113 63,083
Sudan 1983 20,567 2033 53,040 60,412 64,377
Tunisia 1984 6,975 2034 14,873 15,536 16,742
Region total 1982–1987 121,880 2032–2037 304,988 349,451 374,288
Base Mean End Mean age at end year
Country year age year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Algeria 1987 22.6 2037 34.0 29.7 26.3
Egypt 1986 24.2 2036 35.0 31.2 28.9
Libya 1984 21.2 2034 30.3 27.1 24.5
Morocco 1982 23.5 2032 32.9 29.8 27.4
Sudan 1983 22.3 2033 31.7 28.0 25.4
Tunisia 1984 24.5 2034 36.5 34.3 31.4
Percentage of 0–14 age group
Base End in total population
Country year Ratio year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Algeria 1987 44.0 2037 23.5 31.5 37.9
Egypt 1986 40.1 2036 21.0 27.1 31.8
Libya 1984 49.9 2034 27.3 34.7 40.3
Morocco 1982 42.2 2032 23.2 28.8 34.0
Sudan 1983 44.1 2033 26.4 33.8 39.1
Tunisia 1984 39.6 2034 20.1 23.6 28.9
Percentage of 60+ age group
Base End in total population
Country year Ratio year Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Algeria 1987 5.7 2037 14.8 11.3 8.4
Egypt 1986 5.7 2036 14.2 11.1 9.1
Libya 1984 5.5 2034 9.9 7.9 6.2
Morocco 1982 6.1 2032 12.5 9.9 8.0
Sudan 1983 4.0 2033 11.9 9.2 7.1
Tunisia 1984 6.7 2034 17.3 15.1 12.5
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
67
Table 23a. Population by level of education in Algeria.
2037
1987 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 40.9 12.9 17.0 24.5
Primary education 38.7 41.7 47.2 47.7
Secondary education 16.5 40.9 33.0 25.9
Tertiary education 3.9 4.5 2.8 1.9
Female
No schooling 59.6 18.5 23.6 38.2
Primary education 26.9 45.8 45.9 45.9
Secondary education 10.8 32.4 28.6 15.1
Tertiary education 2.7 3.3 1.9 0.8
Total
No schooling 50.1 15.7 20.3 31.3
Primary education 32.9 43.8 46.6 46.8
Secondary education 13.7 36.6 30.8 20.5
Tertiary education 3.3 3.9 2.3 1.4
Table 23b. Population by level of education in Egypt.
2036
1986 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 44.8 12.0 14.1 21.1
Primary education 32.3 33.6 41.2 46.2
Secondary education 19.6 42.9 38.2 28.0
Tertiary education 3.3 11.5 6.5 4.7
Female
No schooling 62.6 14.8 16.4 32.0
Primary education 25.3 37.2 48.3 49.2
Secondary education 11.1 39.0 31.8 17.2
Tertiary education 1.0 9.0 3.5 1.6
Total
No schooling 53.4 13.4 15.3 26.6
Primary education 28.9 35.4 44.7 47.7
Secondary education 15.5 41.0 35.0 22.6
Tertiary education 2.2 10.2 5.0 3.1
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
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Table 23c. Population by level of education in Libya.
2034
1984 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 45.8 12.5 16.5 22.3
Primary education 45.0 25.2 35.6 29.5
Secondary education 7.6 52.2 42.6 42.4
Tertiary education 1.6 10.1 5.3 5.8
Female
No schooling 57.3 14.1 17.5 25.9
Primary education 37.6 31.2 41.2 40.6
Secondary education 4.4 46.5 34.1 30.2
Tertiary education 0.7 8.2 7.2 3.3
Total
No schooling 51.4 13.3 17.0 24.1
Primary education 41.4 28.2 38.4 35.1
Secondary education 6.1 49.3 38.3 36.2
Tertiary education 1.1 9.2 6.3 4.6
Table 23d. Population by level of education in Morocco.
2032
1982 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 59.8 37.2 47.7 54.9
Primary education 26.8 41.8 38.4 35.0
Secondary education 12.1 19.0 13.1 9.6
Tertiary education 1.3 2.0 0.8 0.5
Female
No schooling 72.0 46.5 60.5 70.3
Primary education 19.8 37.4 31.7 25.1
Secondary education 7.5 14.7 7.5 4.5
Tertiary education 0.7 1.4 0.3 0.1
Total
No schooling 65.9 41.9 54.2 62.8
Primary education 23.3 39.6 35.0 29.9
Secondary education 9.8 16.8 10.3 7.0
Tertiary education 1.0 1.7 0.5 0.3
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
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Table 23e. Population by level of education in Sudan.
2033
1983 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 73.8 49.3 72.1 73.9
Primary education 19.6 40.7 23.7 22.4
Secondary education 6.1 9.4 4.1 3.6
Tertiary education 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1
Female
No schooling 82.5 53.6 78.7 79.9
Primary education 13.9 38.1 18.7 17.8
Secondary education 3.4 7.9 2.5 2.3
Tertiary education 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0
Total
No schooling 78.0 51.5 75.4 77.0
Primary education 16.8 39.3 21.2 20.0
Secondary education 4.8 8.7 3.3 2.9
Tertiary education 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1
Table 23f. Population by level of education in Tunisia.
2034
1984 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Male
No schooling 42.3 10.5 11.8 17.5
Primary education 39.2 37.8 45.4 51.7
Secondary education 16.2 43.9 40.2 29.4
Tertiary education 2.3 7.8 2.6 1.4
Female
No schooling 57.8 15.3 17.2 34.1
Primary education 32.7 40.9 47.9 51.1
Secondary education 8.7 37.4 33.4 14.4
Tertiary education 0.8 6.4 1.5 0.4
Total
No schooling 49.9 12.9 14.6 25.8
Primary education 36.0 39.4 46.6 51.4
Secondary education 12.5 40.7 36.8 21.9
Tertiary education 1.6 7.0 2.0 0.9
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
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Table 24. Average annual rate of population growth over projection period
(in percent).
Growth during projection period
Base yeara Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Algeria 2.6 (1985–1990) 2.1 2.4 2.6
Egypt 2.5 (1985–1990) 1.6 1.9 2.1
Libya 4.4 (1980–1985) 2.5 2.8 3.0
Morocco 2.4 (1980–1985) 2.0 2.2 2.3
Sudan 2.8 (1980–1985) 1.9 2.2 2.3
Tunisia 2.6 (1980–1985) 1.5 1.6 1.8
Scenario 1: low fertility/low mortality/high education.
Scenario 2: central fertility/central mortality/central education.
Scenario 3: high fertility/high mortality/low education.
aUN (1994).
to at least 145 million – 5 million more than the estimated population size
of North Africa in 1990. Because of their proximity to Europe, the Maghreb
countries (and their rapid population increases) are of special interest to the
European Union. It is interesting to note that the combined population of
Algeria and Morocco, countries that currently have the largest number of
immigrants to Europe, grows to, at least, about 119 million, 2.8 times its
size in the base year. By contrast, the population of Libya grows to 11–14
million and that of Tunisia to 15–17 million by the end of the period. Egypt
continues to rank first in population size. The low scenario for Egypt gives
a total population of about 107 million, in contrast to 126 million under the
central scenario and 133 million under the high scenario (Table 22 ). The
central and high scenarios show that the population of Sudan triples over
a 50-year period. Even under low-scenario assumptions the population of
Sudan grows to about 53 million.
Although the population of the region continues to increase over the
next 40 years, it grows at a slower pace than in the past (Table 24 ). Even
under the extreme scenario of high fertility combined with high mortality, the
average annual rate of population growth in 2032–2037 would be equal to (for
Algeria) or below (all other countries) the annual rate of growth in 1980–1985
or 1985–1990. The decrease is quite dramatic in the case of Libya, where the
population that had grown at a rate of 4.4 percent per year in the early 1980s
only grows at a rate of 3.0 percent in the 2030s under the high-fertility/high-
mortality scenario. The three scenarios show little difference in the annual
rate of growth, which at the maximum is 0.5 percentage points in the case
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of Algeria between the high-fertility/high-mortality scenario and the low-
fertility/low-mortality scenario. In the central scenario, which follows the
school enrollment projections of UNESCO for the near future, the population
growth is systematically lower when education is available to more and more
people. Ranked according to transition rates (all levels) and percentage
point differences of annual growth rates between 1982–1987 and 2032–2037,
we found the highest to the lowest to be as follows: Libya, Tunisia, Egypt,
Algeria, and Morocco. Only Sudan does not fit into this picture because
even under the central scenario we assume that fertility and mortality rates
remain quite high and that the impact of education is limited.
6.2 Age structure
The age pyramids given in the Color Plates show the age structures of the
populations in the countries of North Africa. Table 22 presents the per-
centages of the youngest and oldest age groups in the populations. The
pattern for the young age group continues to dominate the age structure
of the populations of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Sudan. The high and
central scenarios show that at the end of the projection period between 29
percent and 40 percent of the total population are in the 0–14 age group in
these countries. Only under low-fertility, low-mortality, and high-education
assumptions (low scenario) do these percentages fall to 23–27 percent. By
contrast, Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that are currently experi-
encing rapid declines in fertility, have different age structures. For Egypt,
the high scenario shows that the percentage of the 0–14 age group in the
total population (40.1 percent) decreases by about 8 percentage points, com-
pared with 13 and 19 percentage points under the central and low scenarios,
respectively. For Tunisia the high scenario shows that the proportion in
the 0–14 age group decreases by about 11 percentage points (from 39.6 to
28.9), compared with 16 and 19.5 percentage points for the central and low
scenarios, respectively.
The scenarios also show that the 60+ proportion in the total popula-
tion increases such that the countries experience a slightly different aging
process. The two extreme cases are Libya and Tunisia. Under high-scenario
assumptions the 60+ proportion in the total population increases slightly
to 6.2 percent in Libya and almost doubles to 12.5 percent in Tunisia. The
base year parameters, as well as the high, central, and low scenarios, show
that the youngest mean age is in Libya and the oldest is in Tunisia.
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6.3 Educational composition
Given past demographic and educational trends, these projections provide
a picture of possible future educational attainments of the populations in
North Africa. Table 23 gives the percentage of males, females, and total
population by level of education in the base year and end year of the pro-
jection period for the six countries in North Africa. The results of the three
scenarios are astounding.
All three scenarios show a substantial decline in the percentage of the
population with no schooling in all countries except Morocco and the Sudan,
where an appreciable decline is envisaged only under low-scenario assump-
tions. Even with low education, high fertility, and high mortality (high
scenario), the percentage of the population with no schooling is not more
than half the percentage in the base year in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
The central and low scenarios give further substantial reductions for these
three countries. At the primary level, women realize considerable gains in
education.
Another important result from these projection scenarios is that at all
levels of education in all countries except Libya, the gender disparities in
education narrows considerably, because educational attainment increases
more for women than for men. The educational gaps between men and
women are smaller under the central and low scenarios than in the base
year or under the high scenario. At the primary level, the central and low
scenarios for Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya give higher percentages for females
than for males.
Another interesting point when we look across scenarios is that educa-
tion in a given population can spread quickly when low fertility rates and
high rates of educational enrollment are combined. This situation is evident
when we consider fertility differentials by educational level. The central sce-
nario for Tunisia and Egypt illustrates this point. The TFR decreases from
5.6 to 2.6 by the year 2036 for Egypt (Table 17 ) and from 4.5 to 2.2 by 2034
for Tunisia (Table 21 ). This fertility decline is associated with substantial
educational achievement: full intake for boys and girls in primary school,
secondary school enrollment above 70 percent, and tertiary education above
20 percent. These assumptions allow the two countries to reach an advan-
tageous demographic and educational situation by the end of the projection
period. In the two countries, about 40 percent of the total population and 35
percent of the female population have at least a secondary education under
the central scenario. Of those individuals in the working-age group (ages 20
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to 60), the percentage of the population with at least a secondary degree
is above 50 percent (46 percent for women). In Egypt less than 1 percent
of the population in the working-age group is without any schooling (1 per-
cent of women) and in Tunisia this rate is 2 percent for the total population
and 4 percent for women of working age. The age structure shows that the
two countries have the lowest percentage of young people and conversely the
highest proportion of people over age 60.
However, progress is slower when we consider – still under the central
scenario – the other combinations of (a) high fertility and high education
(Libya and Algeria), (b) low fertility and low education (Morocco), and (c)
high fertility and low education (Sudan). The central scenario for Libya
shows what happens when the diffusion of education in the population is
not followed by a proportional fertility decline. In 1984, Libya had the
most widespread educational system of the region but a TFR of 6.8 and a
fertility rate of 4.5 for women with a tertiary education. If we extend this
trend of high fertility levels to all educational categories and at the same
time apply a global decline to the TFR until it reaches 3.6 in 2034, the
population continues to have the age structure of a developing country with
a large young age group (35 percent) and a very small elderly age group (8
percent). However, the working-age population is very educated: 67 percent
of the 20–60-year-old population has received an education and 60 percent
of working-age women have at least some secondary education.
Algeria is an intermediate case where school enrollments are relatively
high – not as high as in Libya, but close to those of Egypt and Tunisia.
The situation in Algeria in 2037 is very different from that in Libya, Egypt,
and Tunisia. Under the central scenario, the age pyramid remains very large
at the base until the end of the projection period (32 percent in the 0–
14 age group). The majority of the working-age population has primary or
secondary qualifications (90 percent in the total population and 87 percent in
the female population) although 7 percent still has no education (11 percent
for women); and 0.7 percent has some tertiary education.
Morocco and Sudan were the two countries with the highest proportion
of people without any education in 1982 and 1983 (66 percent and 78 per-
cent, respectively). This handicap is difficult to overcome. Under the central
scenario, by 2030 most countries in the region are able to eliminate illiteracy
(which we consider, for simplification purposes, similar to the level of no
education) with the exception of Morocco and Sudan. The UNESCO pro-
jections of enrollment rates for these two countries are rather pessimistic:
the total enrollment rate for all levels increase, at best, a few percentage
74
points (Morocco) or decrease (Sudan). This explains the educational com-
position of the population at the end of the projection period under the
central scenario. In Morocco, 49 percent of the 20–60 age group would have
had no education (for Sudan the figure is 72 percent) with a large gender
discrepancy: 57 percent of the women (76 percent in Sudan). The low sce-
nario (low-fertility/low-mortality/high-education) shows a brighter future.
We can see from the age pyramids that the population receives access to
educational development but, because of the time lag between school age
and working age, the majority of the 20–60-year-old population is still uned-
ucated (53 percent in Sudan and 40 percent in Morocco). This result shows
that the momentum of education adds to the population momentum.
The three scenarios for Tunisia offer an interesting example of diverse
population composition. Although the three scenarios give very similar total
population results (15.5 million, 16.7 million, and 14.9 million in 2034, re-
spectively, for the central, high, and low scenarios, Table 22 ), the age and ed-
ucational structures are quite different under each scenario (see Color Plates
for age pyramids). Under the low scenario (low-fertility/low-mortality/high-
education) the educational progress of the population is spectacular and the
proportion of people without an education is about 13 percent for both sexes
and can only be found in the 60+ age group. Already 40 percent of the pop-
ulation has some secondary or tertiary education. At the other extreme, in
2034 the high scenario (high-fertility/high-mortality/low-education) shows
26 percent of the total population without any education, hiding a large
male–female differential of 16 percentage points.
7. Outlook
7.1 Probabilistic population projections of
North Africa to 2100
In this section, we aggregate the projection results obtained for Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia and compare them to the re-
gional probabilistic projections for North Africa produced in the process of
preparing the 1996 revised edition of The Future Population of the World
(Lutz, 1996). North Africa was one of the 13 regions included in this first set
of probabilistic world population projections up to the year 2100. The ap-
proach is based on expert judgment about trends and uncertainties of future
fertility, mortality, and migration in all world regions. For each demographic
component, a group of experts defined three alternative future paths: low,
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central, and high. A standard normal distribution was fitted to these as-
sumptions, with the central assumption giving the most likely case (mean)
and the low and high assumptions giving the 90 percent range of all possible
cases. Drawing randomly from these distributions, 4,000 simulations were
performed to determine uncertainty distributions of the future population
size and age structure of the world.
The starting year of these projections was 1995; the population estimates
were based on the 1995 population data sheet of the Population Reference
Bureau (PRB). Age structures were derived from the 1994 UN assessment
and adjusted to correspond with the 1995 PRB data. Mortality and fertility
information were also derived from these sources; migration data were taken
from Zlotnik (1994). For the region of North Africa several assumptions
were made. Total fertility was estimated to decline from 4.35 in 1995 to 3.92
in 2000, 2.00 in 2030–2035, and 1.54 in 2080–2085 in the low case; to 4.13
in 2000, 3.00 in 2030–2035, and 2.04 in 2080–2085 in the central case; and
to 4.35 in 2000, 4.00 in 2030–2035, and 2.54 in 2080–2085 in the high case.
Life expectancy, which was 62.7 years for men and 65.3 years for women
in North Africa in 1995, was assumed to increase by 0.5 years per decade
in the low case; by 2.25 years, in the central case; and by 4 years, in the
high case. After 2035 increases per decade were assumed to be half these
amounts. For migration the low case assumed no net-migration: the central
case assumed a net loss of 237,500 persons per year; and the high case, a net
loss of 475,000 per year. [For a justification of these assumptions and the
specific age patterns, see Lutz (1996), which also gives a detailed comparison
to the UN projections].
The results show that in the most likely case the population of the region
increases from 162 million in 1995 to 277 million in 2020, 440 million in 2050,
and 630 million by the end of the next century (Table 25 ). Hence, the popu-
lation is likely to increase by almost a factor of four. It is interesting to note
that the same figure of 277 million for 2020 was obtained through the projec-
tions by educational states presented in Section 6 if we add the population
results of the six countries during the 2018–2022 period for the central sce-
nario (central fertility/central mortality/central education). Calculated on
the basis of the 1950 population, the total population of the region increases
by an incredible factor of 12 over just one and a half centuries. This is the
most likely case. The uncertainty distribution of this increase is depicted
in Figure 5 . The figure shows that by 2020 the uncertainty range is still
narrow: the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from 254 million to 300
million. The aggregated figures obtained through the high, central, and low
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Table 25. Mean, median, and 95 percent confidence intervals for North
Africa in 1995, 2020, 2050, and 2100.
Population 0–14 age group 60+ age group
(in millions) (in %) (in %)
1995 162 38.8 5.9
2020
Mean 277 33.9 7.9
Median 277 34.0 7.9
2.5 254 30.0 7.2
97.5 300 37.5 8.7
2050
Mean 440 27.0 13.6
Median 439 27.3 13.3
2.5 309 18.6 9.4
97.5 583 34.2 19.2
2100
Mean 630 18.7 24.0
Median 598 19.0 23.0
2.5 228 11.5 15.2
97.5 1,202 25.1 37.4
Table 26. Aggregated results of the projections for six countries in North
Africa, 2018–2022.
Central Low High
Population (in millions) 277 259 282
0–14 (in %) 33.9 29.8 36.1
60+ (in %) 7.7 8.7 6.9
scenarios mentioned in Section 6 fall within this range. The central scenario
gives exactly the mean of the probabilistic projection (277 million). The
populations resulting from the high (282 million) and the low (259 million)
scenarios are very close to the lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent
confidence intervals of these probabilistic projections (Table 26 ). By 2050
the span of the 95 percent confidence interval increases from 309 million to
583 million, and by 2100 the uncertainty range is extremely wide, ranging
from a low 228 million (which is still higher than today’s population) to
an incredible 1.2 billion – a range of 1 billion people. But this range in-
cludes some rather unlikely cases. Looking at the most likely case, i.e., the
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Figure 5. Future population size in North Africa. Figures on the right-
hand side refer to the probability that the population size will lie below the
line indicated.
range between the 0.2 and the 0.8 fractiles, the uncertainty range in 2100
diminishes to somewhat more than 400 million people.
The probability distributions given for the percentage of the population
below age 15 and above age 60 clearly indicate that significant population
aging in the region is virtually certain. This phenomenon, however, happens
slowly; the momentum is high and the region maintains a very young age
structure at least for another 30 years. The probabilistic projections show
that in 97.5 percent of all cases, the proportion of the population that is
below age 15 declines only from 39 percent today to 38 percent in 2020.
The lower confidence limit is not even eight percentage points lower. In
the same manner, the proportion above age 60 increases very slowly from 6
percent today to almost 9 percent in 2020. This process of slow population
aging is also shown through the high, central, and low scenarios discussed
earlier. The central scenario for 2020 reproduces, very closely, the mean of
the probabilistic projection with 33.9 percent of the population in the 0–14
age group and 7.7 percent in the 60+ age group. The low and high scenarios
reflect, as well, the lower and upper confidence limit of the probabilistic
projection. Population aging is more pronounced at the end of the next
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Figure 6. Proportion of the population in North Africa below age 15.
Figures on the right-hand side refer to the probability that the percentage
of the 0–14 age group will lie below the line indicated.
century. Figure 6 shows that in 97.5 percent of all cases the proportion of
the population that is below age 15 declines from close to 40 percent today to
below 25 percent by the end of the 21st century. The proportion above age
60, illustrated in Figure 7, increases in 97.5 percent of all cases from around
5 percent today to above 35 percent. In the most likely case it increases to
above 20 percent.
It is interesting to note that the uncertainty ranges of the young pop-
ulation and the elderly population show very different developments over
time. For the population below age 15 uncertainty about population size
increases quickly because it is immediately affected by the uncertainty of fu-
ture fertility rates. The number of elderly, on the other hand, is not affected
by alternative fertility rates before the middle of the next century, but it is
affected by mortality uncertainty, which evolves more slowly. By the end of
the next century, however, the uncertainty range of the elderly population
(15–37 percent) is much greater than that of the young population (12–25
percent) because of the combined effect of fertility and mortality on the
young population. Alternative migration assumptions also affect the elderly
to a greater extent than the young.
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Figure 7. Proportion of the population in North Africa above age 60.
Figures on the right-hand side refer to the probability that the percentage
of the 60+ age group will lie above the line indicated.
7.2 Possible future migration from North Africa to Europe
The issue of international migration across the Mediterranean has not been
addressed explicitly at the individual country level because of the lack of
reliable data. Furthermore, the objective of this study is to look primarily
at the long-term implications of alternative fertility, mortality, and education
patterns. The migration dimension makes the analysis more complex and
the interpretation of results more difficult. Nevertheless, there is no doubt
that future large-scale migration would have significant effects on both the
sending countries and the receiving countries; most of the latter countries
are in Southern and Western Europe. In this section we numerically address
the migration issue.
Available data on past migration streams show that migration from
North Africa was directed mostly to France and Germany (Zlotnik, 1994).
The flow to France peaked in the 1970–1974 period, when between 70,000
and 80,000 immigrants from the region entered France each year. The num-
ber of immigrants declined during the late 1970s, increased again during the
early 1980s, and has been in a steep decline in recent years. During the
late 1980s annual immigration from the region to France had declined to
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about 20,000. Also during this time there was considerable out-migration
from France to the Maghreb during the 1980s, so it is not clear whether net-
migration was positive during this entire period. According to census statis-
tics, in the early 1990s Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden together hosted about 951,000 Moroccans, 631,000 Algerians, and
242,000 Tunisians (OECD, 1992). In Italy at this time there were 146,000 in-
dividuals from North Africa (including 78,000 Moroccans, 41,000 Tunisians,
and 20,000 Egyptians). Spain also saw increases in the number of immi-
grants from North Africa recently, but the absolute number is still rather
small.
The IIASA world population projections discussed in Section 7.1 (see
also Lutz, 1994b, 1996) make several assumptions about possible future mi-
gration streams. In the high-migration scenario 477,000 North Africans are
assumed to leave the region every year. Of these, 275,000 are assumed to
move to Western Europe and 90,000 to North America. It is assumed that
the rest moves to other world regions (mostly to countries in West and Cen-
tral Asia). The low-migration scenario assumes no new migration between
any regions, and the central (and most likely) scenario assumes half of the
annual stream assumed under the high scenario. Hence, in the central sce-
nario an annual net-migration of about 140,000 is assumed between North
Africa and Western Europe. For Western Europe this is 28 percent of its to-
tal assumed net-migration gain. These assumptions were defined by a group
of experts based on a study of past trends and discussions about possible
alternative future migration patterns under different geopolitical scenarios.
Table 27 shows the effects of the alternative migration assumptions on
total population size and the mean age of the population in the North African
region, combined with central fertility and mortality assumptions. From
the table it can be seen that even the very high levels of out-migration
assumed under the high scenario have only a moderate effect on reducing
total population growth in the short and medium term. Over the next
15 years (i.e., to 2010) the most extreme assumptions range from a total
population of 231 million to 224 million, hence a difference of only 7 million
or 3 percent of the total population. In the long term the total population
of the region doubles or perhaps triples by the middle of the next century
and increases by a factor of 3.5 by the end of the next century. In the low
extreme, the case of no out-migration, the population almost triples by the
end of the next century. Hence, the range between the high extreme and
the low extreme, which is assumed to cover about 90 percent of all possible
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Table 27. Alternative migration scenarios for North Africa under central
fertility and mortality assumptions combined with low and high migration.
Total population Mean age of population
(in millions) (in years)
Low Central High Low High
migration migration migration migration migration
1995 162 162 162 24.6 24.6
2010 231 228 224 26.0 26.0
2020 284 277 271 27.4 27.4
2030 340 331 321 29.0 29.0
2050 457 439 421 32.1 32.1
2100 645 607 569 39.4 39.6
future migration streams, is 36 million migrants by the middle of the next
century and 76 million by the end of the next century.
Table 27 also shows that there is virtually no effect of alternative mi-
gration assumptions on the speed of population aging. The mean age of the
population will still increase from today’s 24.6 years to 32.1 by the middle of
the next century, and to more than 39 years by the end of the next century.
At that time the high-migration scenario shows a somewhat higher mean
age of the population because migrants tend to be younger.
The total population size and the speed of population aging in the region
are affected not only by the numbers considered in the alternative migra-
tion scenarios but also by the amount of education the out-migrants have
received. However, there is too little information about the structure of
migrants to include this dimension explicitly in the alternative migration
scenarios. Two other crucial issues are the kind of ties the migrants retain
with their country of origin and whether they send remittances home. Also,
looking only at net-migration may hide some very important factors such
as persons returning after having received an education abroad or with new
technologies or new life-styles that may exert some influence on the living
conditions in the home country. These issues are not examined in this study,
but should be the topic of further in-depth studies.
Finally one might ask, What effect would alternative migration streams
from North Africa to Western Europe have on the receiving countries? This
question has been discussed in the literature. Lutz and Prinz (1992) and
Lutz (1994b) have extensively analyzed the demographic consequences of
alternative immigration and integration scenarios. In short, even massive
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immigration to Western Europe cannot reverse or stop the strong and very
pronounced aging process that will be experienced over the coming decades.
Under the central scenario the proportion of the population above age 60
increases from today’s 19 percent to 35 percent in the year 2050. Under
the high-migration scenarios (assuming an annual gain of 1 million, of which
275,000 would come from North Africa), this proportion in 2050 is only one
percentage point lower, i.e., 34 percent; under the low-migration scenario 36
percent of the population in Western Europe is above age 60. This marginal
difference in the speed of aging, however, is associated with a total population
size that in 2050 is 505 million (high migration) instead of 433 million (low
migration), i.e., a 17 percent difference.
8. Conclusion: Population, Education, and
Sustainable Development
In concluding this report we return to the initial question of why we study
population and education in the context of long-term national development.
Both aspects clearly deserve individual attention. It is interesting and rel-
evant to study population and education as complex and important soci-
etal phenomena in themselves. In the first part of this study we provided
comprehensive surveys of recent population and education trends in the six
countries of North Africa and also discussed our assumptions about likely
future trends of these two important variables.
In the second part of the study we went beyond the sectoral analysis
of population and education and entered new territory by looking at inter-
actions and combined effects of population and education. Because these
two phenomena – which in the past have generally been treated as separate
issues – follow similar laws of change, this effort proved highly successful.
To our knowledge this is the first attempt at systematic, international pop-
ulation and education projections. This combined analysis of education and
population makes a significant contribution to our knowledge about both
variables.
The educational composition of the population is the most important
variable through which educational efforts benefit society. Educational ex-
penditures, numbers of teachers, and enrollment rates are only intermediate
variables that influence the educational composition of the population. The
results of educational efforts, rather than the efforts themselves, determine
the human capital of a society. It is amazing how little analysis has been
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undertaken to study the results of educational efforts. This neglect has
probably been due to methodological problems inherent in the fact that ed-
ucational change of the population is a very slow and long-term process.
Actually it is only the union with population projections that allows us to
conduct these longer-term projections of the educational composition of the
population by age in a methodologically accurate manner. In this sense,
the combination of education and population projections adds significantly
to the analysis of education itself. It is the only way in which the future
consequences of current educational efforts can be evaluated.
Also, the population projection itself benefits from the inclusion of the
educational dimension because all three components of population change
(fertility, mortality, and migration) vary significantly with education. The
explicit consideration of educational fertility differentials makes a major dif-
ference to the projection of total population size and the population’s age
structure if the educational composition of the population changes over time.
Given that the fertility rate of women in the highest educational group is
lower than the average fertility level, an increase in the relative size of the
group of highly educated women in the childbearing ages (which is evident
in most countries because of educational efforts in the past) will in itself re-
sult in a decline of the fertility of the total population, even if fertility rates
within each educational status are assumed to remain constant. Hence, given
that a population’s educational composition is one of the most important
structural components, next to age and sex, making it explicit in the pro-
cess can only add to the validity of the population projection in the same
way that the cohort-component model adds to a simple exponential growth
model that disregards age structure.
The results of the educational population projections presented in this
report have been very encouraging in a more practical way. They have shown
that such projections are indeed feasible in terms of data and methodology.
The multistate population projection methodology is readily available and
educational composition by age is usually provided by censuses. Data on cur-
rent enrollment ratios are also available for most countries, and assumptions
on future rates must be derived somewhat intuitively in any case. Given the
overriding importance of the educational composition of the population – in
addition to its size and age structure – for increased productivity, social de-
velopment, and government planning, we recommend that such projections
be conducted for all countries of the world.
In the context of the global discussion of the concept of sustainable de-
velopment, both population and education are frequently mentioned as two
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of the most important variables (if not the most important variables), but
they are usually seen as independent forces. On the one hand, population
is usually discussed under a carrying-capacity approach that only considers
the number of people but does not look at the educational level of individ-
uals or their skills in coping with problems. Education, on the other hand,
is seen by many as the key to coping with present and anticipated future
problems (ecological and others), but is often considered an element that
is restricted to the minds of people, disregarding the social mechanisms of
dissemination of education and the slow replacement of generations with
different levels and types of education. Obviously both of these unrelated,
and in some cases even contradictory, views describe some relevant aspects
in a country’s struggle toward sustainable development. The present study
shows that these views need not be unrelated (or even contradictory) but
can be described and even projected jointly. We think that the considera-
tion of population and education in a joint analysis provides opportunities
for improving the plans for sustainable development.
Notes
[1] In World Fertility Surveys place of current residence is divided into three cat-
egories: rural, other urban, and major urban. The basic definition of rural
versus urban is left to the discretion of individual countries. Countries use
various criteria based on population size, sewerage, electricity, and so on to dif-
ferentiate between rural and urban areas. Further division of urban areas into
“other urban” and “major urban” is based on a set of rules; for example, cities
with a population of more than 1 million are classified as major urban and na-
tional capitals regardless of population size are classified as major urban (UN,
1987:190).
[2] In Egypt the governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, fron-
tier governorates, and capitals of other governorates as well as district capitals
(Markaz) are considered urban.
[3] SMAM is the mean age at first marriage of women who marry by age 50, and is
estimated by adding the proportion currently single at successive ages as though
they referred to a single real cohort of women.
[4] We compared UNESCO statistics on students by gender with statistics pub-
lished in the statistical yearbooks of countries in North Africa. It is important
to note that UNESCO defines three levels of education; the first level covers pri-
mary education in public and private schools, including primary classes attached
to secondary schools; the second level covers general education, teacher-training,
and technical- and vocational-training in public and private schools; the third
level covers universities and equivalent degree-granting institutions and other
third-level institutions such as teacher-training colleges and technical colleges
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(UNESCO, 1994). Each country in North Africa has its own definition of ed-
ucational levels. For the sake of comparison in the text we give the UNESCO
level that corresponds to the national level(s).
[5] General education refers to preuniversity level, including first and second level
and excluding preschool education.
[6] The Al-Azhar is the oldest institute for teaching courses on Islamic studies in
the Arab countries.
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